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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates the association between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences 
in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US 
public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find that firms with strong CSR records 
engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that this relationship is 
robust when accounting for differences in governance structure and 
correcting for endogeneity via simultaneous equations modeling. 
Additional testing indicates that performance in the employee relations 
dimension of CSR in particular increases with risk-taking, while high firm 
visibility dampens the association between CSR and the accounting-based 
measures of risk-taking. Prior literature establishes that high managerial 
risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing 
investment decisions. Thus, the main findings suggest that CSR, rather than 
being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect 
of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by 
documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others 
through which CSR maps into higher firm value. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate social responsibility has been gaining momentum in prevalence and importance 
throughout the world. It continues to receive increasing attention from firms, the financial 
community, and policy-makers. Stephen Jordan, the senior vice president of the US Chamber of 
Commerce, comments on the rising trend. “In 2000 there might have been a dozen Fortune 500 
companies who issued a CSR or sustainability report. Now almost all of them do.” Likewise, the 
United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI), which advocates the integration 
of CSR strategies throughout investment decisions, has experienced tremendous growth since its 
inception. Launched in 2006, the organization has grown from twenty signatories representing 
USD 2 trillion to over 180 signatories representing USD 8 trillion in just a single year1.  
This increasing focus has sparked debate among academics and industry figures alike 
regarding the role of CSR. Milton Friedman strongly criticized CSR in a 1970 New York Times 
article, stating that “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.” Similarly, 
Preston and O’Bannon (1997) find that some executives engage in “managerial opportunism”, a 
value-destructive overinvestment in CSR that serve only to garner private benefits such as 
improved reputation. Some scholars, however, argue that though markets may undervalue CSR in 
the short run, it creates shareholder value in the long run (Renneboog, Ter Horst, Zhang, 2008). 
Many studies support the view that CSR strategies are actually vital to long-term stability, 
sustainability, and success (Freeman, 1984). The contradictory findings concerning corporate 
social responsibility pose a dilemma for the business community regarding whether to invest in 
such activities. Overall, the current literature is inconclusive regarding the association between 
CSR and financial performance (Strike, Gao, and Bansal, 2006).  
 Researchers have examined the impacts of CSR from many different angles in order to 
gain a clearer grasp of its practical implications. Prior studies have investigated the association of 
CSR with the cost of equity capital, stock returns, firm value, and more, in an attempt to ascertain 
how such activities may be aligned with shareholder interests. While each study offers an 
                                                 
1 United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (http://www.unpri.org/press/principles-for-responsible-
investment-hit-8-trillion-mark-on-first-year-anniversary/) 
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incremental understanding of the nature of CSR, they provide at best indirect evidence on how it 
relates to the firm at a more fundamental level of operation and decision-making. Specifically, 
they offer only partial explanations on whether the adoption of CSR strategies facilitates or hinders 
management’s fiduciary duty to shareholders. In this dissertation, we contribute to the debate by 
investigating the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-
taking, as well as how this association is affected by differences in governance structure. 
 This investigation can help explain the role of CSR in the corporate strategy from an agency 
perspective. Managerial risk-taking has important implications for firm growth, performance, and 
survival (Bromiley, 1991) but has also been established in literature as a serious agency problem 
(Low, 2009). Managers have incentives to remain conservative in their investments by forgoing 
profitable but risky projects. To elaborate, managers usually have a large proportion of firm-
specific wealth that is non-diversifiable. Thus, they are exposed to much more firm-specific risk 
and may exhibit significant investment distortions resulting from their increased risk-aversion 
(Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach 2005). Conservative risk choices are also associated with other 
self-serving motives, such as managers’ desire to protect their career or to siphon corporate 
resources for personal use (John, Litov, and Yeung 2008). Abundant evidence exists throughout 
the literature that describes how managers have incentives to maintain low risk-taking in order to 
capture private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Conversely, the shareholders prefer that 
firms undertake any positive net-present-value (NPV) projects, regardless of its associated risks 
(Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, 2011). With their wealth usually diversified over many different 
firms and industries, it is in their interest for managers to take risky, value-generating investment 
decisions. Thus, corporate risk-taking can indicate to what degree management’s decisions are 
aligned with shareholder interests. By investigating the relation between firms’ CSR activities and 
risk-taking, we can see whether undertaking CSR initiatives is consistent with shareholder value-
maximizing behavior. 
 However, it must be recognized that outside factors may significantly affect decisions 
regarding both CSR and risk-taking. For instance, various bylaws and incentive schemes exist that 
aim to protect shareholders by limiting managerial risk-aversion. Firms with strong investor 
protection have been associated with higher levels of risk-taking, and accordingly, with greater 
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firm-level growth (John et al., 2008). Other provisions are enacted to prevent managerial 
entrenchment. Entrenched managers are more able to pursue investment opportunities that advance 
their private interests rather than those of their shareholders (Baber, Liang, Zhu, 2012). The 
literature suggests that these entrenched managers would exhibit excessive conservatism with 
respect to risk tolerance. Boards with different characteristics take different corporate actions and 
decisions (Weisbach, 1988; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008). Since the adoption of CSR strategy 
is a result of corporate decisions (Renneboog et al., 2008), it can be argued that governance and 
board characteristics can impact the degree of a firm’s commitment to CSR. Likewise, governance 
quality has also been found to strongly affect the level of corporate risk-taking (John et al., 2008; 
Aggarwal et al., 2008). Thus the consideration of corporate governance in this study is crucial for 
understanding the nuances and the complexity of the association between CSR and risk-taking. 
Using a sample of US public firms, we find that managerial risk-taking increases with CSR 
performance. Specifically, risk-taking increases with the presence of socially responsible actions 
while it decreases with the presence of socially irresponsible actions. Furthermore, we find that 
accounting for differences in governance structure robustly confirms these relationships. The 
results show that corporate risk taking and good governance may be channels through which CSR 
enhances firm value.  
This study contributes to the literature by introducing CSR as a determinant of risk-taking. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly and comprehensively investigate 
the association between the two variables. Furthermore, it accounts for differences in governance 
as well as the possibility that CSR may be an endogenous variable through a simultaneous 
equations framework. 
The results of this study contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the legitimacy of CSR 
within business strategy. Corporate boards and shareholders may benefit from knowing that CSR 
activities are not necessarily value-destructive but are in fact aligned with value-enhancing 
behavior. Policy-makers can also be better informed of the implications of any proposed 
regulations regarding governance and CSR and how they may affect firm performance via risk 
preferences. Ideally, it can lead to more effective policies that balance the interests of shareholders 
and other stakeholders in a sustainable manner.  
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Our findings may appear to contradict prior studies regarding the relation between CSR 
and the cost of equity capital, however a closer look into the matter may suggest otherwise. This 
paper documents that CSR performance is associated with increased risk-taking, which in turn can 
be associated with a higher cost of equity capital (Parrino et al., 2005). This can be partially 
explained by investors’ awareness of the riskiness of the firms’ operations and thus demanding a 
greater return. However, CSR performance has been empirically linked to a reduced cost of equity 
capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). This apparent contradiction can be reconciled 
by understanding the different implications pertaining to CSR involvement. CSR can lead to a 
lower cost of equity by way of reduced litigation risk (El Ghoul et al., 2011) and a wider investor 
base (Heinkel et al., 2001). On the other hand, the positive relation between CSR and risk-taking 
can be explained from a sustainability perspective. It has been argued that CSR is vital to the long-
term success and sustainability of the firm (Freeman, 1984), meanwhile risk-taking is necessary 
for undertaking profitable projects and firm growth (John et al., 2008). By considering the reduced 
litigation risk, wider investor base, and the indication of long-term success and profitability, CSR 
may lead to a reduced cost of equity capital despite the riskier corporate operations. 
This paper relates to the study by Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010), who investigate 
whether firms take into account employees’ welfare when deciding on the optimal amount of 
leverage. However, the specificity of their study makes it unavoidably narrow. They examine the 
association between a single dimension of CSR (employee relations) with firm leverage, a specific 
form of risk-taking. In contrast, our study uses the full range of CSR dimensions reported in the 
KLD database. We use measures that aggregate as well as disaggregate all CSR dimensions in 
addition to separating them between socially responsible and irresponsible actions, as indicated by 
the strengths and concerns ratings. We also use multiple and more comprehensive measures of 
corporate risk-taking that better reflect management’s discretionary choices. Furthermore, we 
include corporate governance to examine how existing rights and restrictions affect the causal 
mechanisms between CSR and risk-taking.  
This paper also relates to the study by Jiao (2010), who look at how a company’s social 
performance affects firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. She finds a positive association 
between a corporation’s CSR rating and firm value. Our paper can provide insight on the possible 
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underlying decision-making process that led to such an outcome. By examining the association 
between CSR and risk-taking, we can see how CSR is related to various other firm characteristics 
that are affected by risk-taking, including firm value. More importantly, Jiao (2010) raises 
concerns about how most studies treat CSR as a strictly exogenous variable and are thus plagued 
with endogeneity issues. We address this by incorporating proxies of corporate governance and 
insider ownership and employing the method of simultaneous equation modeling. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides additional 
discussion of the relevant streams of literature, while section 3 presents the research hypotheses 
that are tested in this investigation. Section 4 outlines the data collection and variables 
construction, section 5 discusses the methodology and empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Corporate social responsibility 
“To fully meet their corporate social responsibility, enterprises should have in place a 
process to integrate social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their 
business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders” (European 
Commission, 2011). 
CSR engagement has been gaining popularity among businesses around the world. 
Governments, media, and activists have become increasingly zealous in holding firms accountable 
for their actions such that “CSR has become an inescapable priority for business leaders in every 
country” (Porter and Kramer, 2006). The prevalence of CSR practices and disclosures inevitably 
inspire much debate and research regarding its legitimacy and whether it belongs in the business 
strategy. It is widely discussed in political debates, national media, and business school education 
(Renneboog et al., 2008), however the link between CSR and financial performance remains 
inconclusive (Strike et al., 2006). This review of literature serves to outline the primary arguments 
and the main findings within the academic research on CSR.  
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One view is that CSR activities are a value-destructive waste of corporate resources. 
Managerial opportunism is an example of managers knowingly undertaking value-reducing CSR 
investments in order to gain private reputational benefits (Preston and O’Bannon, 1997). Similarly, 
Barnea and Rubin (2010) present the overinvestment hypothesis, which suggests that insiders can 
gain utility through unprofitable CSR activities. They investigate the association between firms’ 
CSR ratings and their ownership and capital structures, and find that managers tend to spend more 
resources on CSR when they hold a lower fraction of ownership in the firm. This suggests that 
managers are more likely to undertake CSR activities in cases where shareholders will absorb a 
larger proportion of the costs. Friedman (1970) provides additional criticism of CSR by discussing 
the manager’s contractual agreement with shareholders. He explains how the manager is employed 
by the shareholders with the duty to maximize profits. When an executive pursues social 
objectives, he diverts resources that could have otherwise gone towards profitable investments, 
and instead acts as a public employee or civil servant. These actions effectively impose an 
illegitimate tax on shareholders and conflict with management’s original fiduciary obligations.  
Brown, Helland, and Smith (2006) provide additional evidence by investigating the value-
enhancement theory, which proposes that philanthropy adds value to shareholders. Charitable 
donations can be claimed to enhance firm value through increased employee morale, customer 
loyalty, and leniency from regulators. However, it can also be used against shareholders when the 
donations support managers’ pet charities. They find that larger boards are associated with more 
cash-giving, which comes with significant implications. Larger boards tend to be less focused on 
monitoring the managerial process (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and are also associated with lower 
firm valuation (Yermack, 1996), suggesting that firms with larger boards suffer more from agency 
problems. In addition, Brown et al., (2006) find that firms with greater debt, and thus whose 
activities are under closer monitoring by banks, donated less. Their study overall indicates that 
corporate philanthropy goes against shareholder interests.  
The study by Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin (2006) corroborate the notion that CSR 
hinders financial performance from an investor’s perspective. They posit that socially 
conscientious investors put themselves at a disadvantage through their ethical screening methods 
when constructing portfolios. By excluding certain stocks, their portfolios are unable to achieve 
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the efficiency of those that conduct no such screens. They report an inverse relationship between 
firms’ CSR ratings and their stock returns. Furthermore, they find that a portfolio holding the most 
socially reprehensible firms outperformed the market. Their results are consistent with Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009), who find that a portfolio long in the so-called “sin stocks” (firms involved in 
the alcohol, tobacco, gambling industries) while short in comparable firms achieved significant 
abnormal returns.  
While the prior evidence suggests that CSR is an agency cost, another view is that CSR 
engagement is in fact tied to enhanced financial performance and sustainability. The United 
Nations exhort fiduciaries to recognize that “integrating ESG [environment, social, governance] 
issues into investment and ownership processes is part of responsible investment, and is necessary 
to managing risk and evaluating opportunities for long-term investment” (UN Environment 
Program, 2009). Supporting this sentiment is a report on corporate citizenship compiled by the 
Carroll School of Management within Boston College. They find that firms that aligned ESG 
initiatives with their overall company strategy are as much as nine times more likely to achieve 
important business objectives relative to their non-CSR counterparts. In addition, such companies 
are better able to recruit, motivate, and retain employees as well as enjoy greater growth in market 
share2.  
Jiao (2010) provides further evidence in strong support of CSR. Her study documents a 
causal and positive relation between CSR performance and firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
This result implies that a strong record in CSR represents intangible assets that contribute to 
shareholder value creation, in contrast to the managerial self-serving motives suggested by the 
opposing viewpoints. Firms with strong social performance have also been found to enjoy the 
benefit of a reduced cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). El Ghoul et al. (2011) provide 
consistent empirical support among US firms. Wang, Feng, and Huang (2013) extend this study to 
a global scale and find consistent results among North American, European, and African 
corporations. Their study, however, highlights an interesting aspect regarding CSR, namely that 
different regions hold varying degrees of value and appreciation towards it. They find that Asian 
                                                 
2 Carroll School of Management, The State of Corporate Citizenship 2012 
(http://www.bcccc.net/pdf/SOCC2012HighlightPresentation.pdf) 
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firms exhibited no relation between CSR and the cost of equity, supporting prior research that the 
concept of CSR is relatively new, underdeveloped, or unappreciated in different parts of the world.  
 There are several studies that do not make any direct implications on the relationship 
between CSR and firm value. Results by Humphrey et al. (2012) support the notion of value-
irrelevance with respect to CSR among UK firms. They find no difference in the risk-adjusted 
performance and idiosyncratic risk between socially responsible and irresponsible firms. However, 
rather than taking a neutral stance in the CSR debate, their study can actually further promote CSR 
by reassuring managers that pursuing such activities can benefit society at large while incurring 
no significant financial costs. Other studies indicate that CSR can provide wealth-protective 
benefits that act as a type of insurance, as opposed to directly affecting firm value. Oikonomou et 
al. (2006) find that socially responsible firms maintain lower financial risk during times of high 
market volatility, making them better able at withstanding adverse economic shocks. Additional 
results overall suggest that while socially responsible actions do not necessarily reduce firm risk, 
socially reprehensible actions can significantly increase it. This raises an interesting question 
regarding the nature of socially responsible and irresponsible actions and their impacts on firm 
characteristics. It implies that the two are not mere opposites or reflections of each other, but that 
each are perceived or interpreted differently.  
  There is a growing wealth of literature regarding the practical implications of corporate 
social responsibility. The majority of studies focus on the relationship of CSR with a specific firm 
characteristic. These papers can provide incremental evidence of how CSR is related to various 
aspects of firms, however the focus of the studies is unavoidably narrow. On the other hand, by 
examining its association with managerial discretionary choices, we can take a direct look at how 
CSR is related to the causal decision-making mechanisms within the corporation. An 
understanding of this association can be subsequently used to conjecture how CSR can influence 
a variety of other firm characteristics that arise from this particular decision-making process. Thus, 
we discuss literature on corporate risk-taking in the next subsection. 
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2.2. Managerial risk-taking 
 Managerial risk-aversion has been described as “one of the most important underlying 
variables in all of economics” (Parrino et al., 2005). It is particularly significant in regards to the 
agency relationship and the separation of ownership and control described by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Managers, acting as the agent, have a contractual duty to act in the best interest of their 
shareholders, the principal. Accordingly, executives are obligated to take on the level of risk that 
optimizes shareholder interests. Conflict arises, however, since utility-maximizing managers 
would prefer an altogether different risk profile.  
Byrd, Parrino, and Pritsch (1998) describe this scenario as the “differential risk preference 
problem”. Managers are typically undiversified, as a large portion of their wealth is tied to the 
success of their firm. They can face severe losses during times of distress while receiving limited 
benefits during times of prosperity. This imbalance in the reward system encourages conservatism 
and may motivate managers to implement investment policies suited to their own risk preferences. 
In this context, forgoing potentially very profitable projects can enhance the manager’s expected 
wealth or utility. Considering their superior knowledge of the workings of the firm as well as their 
executive authority, the resulting outcome is commonly a suboptimal risk-taking policy from the 
shareholders’ perspective. Managerial risk-aversion has been recognized as a source of substantial 
agency costs and has received significant attention from corporate boards, regulators, and 
investors. A large body of academic research has also investigated its implications and 
consequences. We continue the review of literature on risk-taking by discussing the primary 
motives among managers as well as common approaches taken to counteract their suboptimal 
behavior. 
Managers have been documented to make conservative risk choices that advance their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders. Executives may exhibit high levels of risk-aversion in 
order to retain certain private benefits, such as the ability to divert corporate cash flows for personal 
use (John et al., 2008). By maintaining a low risk profile, the manager reduces the probability of 
low cash flow states, thus making it easier to inconspicuously siphon corporate resources. 
However, such behavior necessarily involves forgoing certain risky investments that add value to 
the firm, and thus contradicts shareholder interests. Managers may also choose to stay conservative 
15 
 
due career concerns (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992). Since their job security, reputation, and future 
prospects heavily rely on their performance with the firm, they may choose only low risk projects 
in order to avoid potentially embarrassing failures. Parrino et al. (2005) report significant 
distortions in investment decisions due to managerial risk-aversion. Their model indicates that a 
utility-maximizing executive exhibits increasing reluctance in undertaking projects with greater 
risk. They also find that changes in the value of expected tax shields and expected bankruptcy 
costs that accompany investment choices are significant factors that influence the risk-appetite.  
Kim and Lu (2010) find an inverse relation between the proportion of CEO ownership and 
risk-taking. High levels of share ownership can entrench the manager and make it easier for him 
to make self-serving decisions. However, the presence of effective external governance can induce 
greater risk-taking, despite high CEO ownership. This is consistent with results of John et al. 
(2008), who report that strong legal protection of investors is linked to risky and value-enhancing 
decisions. The prior studies support the argument by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that, lacking 
incentives to the contrary, managers will act in ways that maximize their own utility as opposed to 
shareholder wealth.  
Equity-based executive compensation is an important aspect closely related to corporate 
risk-taking. Its use has grown in prevalence in order to align the incentives of managers and 
shareholders. Firms tie compensation to stock price under the assumption that managers will work 
harder to drive up firm value and gain additional pay. However, as discussed previously, the 
undiversified position of the manager can work against shareholders. A well-known remedy is to 
include stock options in compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers are induced to take 
on more risk when they hold stock options as opposed to common shares, due to the positive 
relation between option value and stock return variability (Byrd et al., 1998). Coles et al., (2006) 
investigate the association between vega, the sensitivity of CEO pay to stock return volatility, and 
corporate risk-taking. They find that firms with higher vega implement riskier policy choices, 
invest heavier in R&D, and are highly leveraged. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) provide additional 
supporting evidence among CEOs in the oil and gas industry that increasing vega via executive 
stock options can effectively mitigate risk-aversion  
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Guay (1999) provides insight on how stock options induce more risk-taking relative to 
common stock by investigating convexity in compensation, measured as the change in value of 
the manager’s stockholdings for a given change in stock return volatility. He finds that the 
convexity from options is several orders of magnitude greater than that of common stock, and thus 
offers substantially greater reward for risk-taking. However, under certain circumstances, options 
may again increase managerial risk-aversion. When the executive stock options become deep in-
the-money, their payoff structure begins to strongly resemble that of common stock (Parrino et al., 
2005). Brisley (2006) expresses the importance of carefully managing the convexity of executive 
pay in order to maintain incentives for risk-taking. As the stock price evolves over time, a firm can 
allow early partial vesting of options at appropriate intervals and re-optimize incentives. This can 
reestablish convexity within executive stock option plans and thus continue to encourage growth-
oriented risk-taking.  
External factors also have significant effects on risk-taking. For instance, environments of 
weak political constraints can inhibit risk-taking (Boubakri et al. 2013). They note that the lack of 
appropriate checks and balances on political institutions increase the probability of interference 
and seizure of assets. However, firms with close political connections were found to take on much 
higher risks. This is attributed to the likelihood of government bailout in the case of bankruptcy, 
which allows the firm to continue unrestrained or reckless risk-taking. John et al. (2008) find that 
environments of strong governance, namely investor protection, are conducive to higher risk-
taking, and consequently, greater firm-level growth. Weak investor protection allows wider 
illegitimate use of corporate resources by management, and thus the level of risk-taking remains 
suboptimal for shareholders. 
Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011) present evidence that expresses the importance of 
diversification from the investor’s perspective. Using a large sample of European firms, they find 
that corporations with diversified large shareholders exhibit significantly higher risk-taking 
relative to firms with undiversified large shareholders. The results imply that large shareholders, 
presumed to have more power and sway over top management, can shape corporate risk policy to 
desired levels.  
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There is a growing body of literature on the determinants of risk-taking, however its 
association to CSR remains unexplored. Researchers have instead investigated the relation 
between risk-taking and a variety of other firm characteristics, usually within governance and 
compensation structure. Many incentive schemes and provisions exist specifically to induce 
managers to undertake more risk on behalf of shareholders. With strong investor protection 
recognized to be a crucial aspect of the effective governance of firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer, 2000), there has been an increasing effort to curb management’s self-serving behavior 
and enforce their duty to shareholders. We discuss the literature on corporate governance in the 
next subsection to explore the context, rights, and restrictions that are related to managerial 
decisions, including those pertaining to CSR and risk-taking. 
 
2.3. Corporate governance 
Corporate governance can be described as the system of laws, policies, and processes that 
control and direct a company. To a large extent, it deals with the mechanisms through which 
investors protect their interests from expropriation by management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
John and Senbet, 1998; La Porta et al., 2000). Shleifer et al. (1997) state that the agency problem 
within governance is serious, and that cases where managers abscond or knowingly misallocate 
investors’ funds are plentiful and well-documented. Thus we proceed by first discussing the 
importance of investor protection. 
It has been well-established that strong legal protection of investors is a crucial aspect of 
effective governance, without which methods of external financing would break down (La Porta 
et al., 2000). Minimal protection allows easy opportunities for outright theft by management, 
whereas strong protection deters such behavior by making it significantly more costly and difficult 
(Shleifer et al., 1997). La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that examining investor protection is a more 
useful way to view corporate governance as opposed to the bank-centered or market-centered 
approaches. Their results suggest that country-level legal systems and their enforcement can 
explain the differences in the amount of funds that firms can raise. Another important implication 
from their study is that leaving financial markets alone is not beneficial to their development. 
Outside investors and minority shareholders require legal protection from courts or regulators in 
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order to overcome the interests of those who benefit from the current status quo. Better protection 
reduces fear of expropriation and encourages investors to pay for more equity and debt (La Porta 
et al., 2002), thus aiding in the development of the capital market as well as the overall economy.  
Governance quality varies widely among countries. Firms from countries with weak 
investor protection are documented to invest very little in internal governance characteristics, 
suggesting that the poor legal framework of such countries renders such investments ineffective 
(Aggarwal et al., 2008). Variance in investor protection can also explain differences in managerial 
risk-aversion. As discussed previously, stronger legal protection of outside investors leads to 
greater corporate risk-taking (John et al., 2008). Greater protection curbs the value of private 
benefits and limits the ability of managers to act in a self-serving manner, resulting in the 
undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing projects that management would have otherwise forgone. 
Investor protection has enormous practical implications, and has been recognized in the literature 
to be a key aspect of governance and its associated agency conflicts. It is documented to be an 
important determinant in firm growth and valuation by curtailing certain managerial decisions. 
The prior evidence stresses the necessity to include shareholders rights in our analysis.  
Another important aspect of governance is the impact of board characteristics on the firm. 
The board of directors fulfills the critical role of monitoring and advising top management (Coles 
et al., 2008). They are tasked with representing shareholder interests to the decision-makers of the 
firm (Byrd et al., 1998), which is necessary in part due to the wide dispersion of ownership among 
shareholders (John and Senbet, 1998). A large proportion of individual shareholders do not hold a 
sufficient stake in the firm and thus lack the incentive to monitor. The board then becomes the 
primary means for shareholders to impose control on management. A survey of the literature on 
corporate boards finds that the primary means of measuring board effectiveness is through board 
independence and size.  
It is widely presumed that boards become more independent as the proportion of outside 
directors increases. There has been a push in the US towards board independence in the wake of 
several high profile cases of fraudulent activity by executives. The NYSE recommends having a 
majority of outside directors on the board, as well as having fully independent audit, compensation, 
and nominating committees. As representatives of shareholders, outside directors have significant 
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incentives to prevent and detect abuse by management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). For instance, 
outside directors may wish to uphold their reputation as effective monitors in order to maintain 
favorable career prospects (Baber et al., 2012). On the other hand, inside directors may be less 
likely than outsiders to challenge questionable decisions by the CEO, due to the considerable 
influence CEOs hold over insiders’ careers (Weisbach, 1988). Using a sample of only firms 
employing a (formerly) Big 6 audit firm, Carcello et al. (2002) find a positive relation between 
firms’ audit fees and their boards’ independence, among other qualities. Their findings indicate 
that highly independent boards, with their stronger incentive to preserve their reputation capital, 
demand a differentially higher audit quality to ensure against future liability losses.  
Board size is another important characteristic. Smaller boards are commonly believed to 
be more cohesive, productive, and focused on the monitoring process (Jensen, 1993). On the other 
hand, larger boards, despite providing additional advisors, may suffer significant free-rider issues 
and tend to have more problems with communication, organization, and decision-making (John et 
al., 1998; Brown et al., 2006). The study by Yermack (1996) supports the notion in favor of smaller 
boards. Using a sample of the 500 largest US corporations, he reports an inverse relation between 
board size and firm value. However, important findings by Coles et al. (2008) reveal that board 
characteristics are not one-dimensional issues. They find that complex firms, such as those 
diversified over several industries or large in size, actually perform better with larger boards. They 
attribute this to complex firms having greater advising requirements and thus benefiting from 
additional directors. Furthermore, they find that firms which require a high degree of insider-
specific knowledge, such as R&D intensive businesses, perform better with a larger proportion of 
inside directors. Their results challenge conventional knowledge that smaller boards and outside 
directors universally benefit all firms.  
 Entrenchment is another significant issue in corporate governance. Managers or boards 
entrench themselves through various means including the use of poison pills, staggered boards, or 
golden parachutes in order to make their removal significantly more difficult or costly. Another 
method is to focus investments on projects that are well-suited to the manager’s skills or 
specialization in order to increase the cost of their replacement (Byrd et al., 1998). Entrenched 
managers are in a better position to arrange excessive compensation plans for themselves or to 
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pursue investment opportunities that contradict their fiduciary duties. Consequently, managers 
with strong takeover defenses may have adverse effects on the firm as they lack incentives to 
respond to shareholder demands for accountability (Baber et al., 2012). 
Prior literature confirms that managers resist takeovers more for protecting their private 
benefits of control as opposed to serving shareholder interests (Shleifer et al., 1997). The famous 
study by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) presents the G-index as a measure of entrenchment. 
They find that firms with deeply entrenched managers are associated with lower stock returns and 
firm value. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2006) extend this study by determining which of the 24 
provisions included in the G-index are significant. They find that only six governance provisions 
fully drive the association originally documented by Gompers et al. (2003) and subsequently 
suggest that many provisions either do not matter or are an endogenous product of others. 
However, both Bebchuk et al. (2006) and Gompers et al. (2003) stress that causality is 
inconclusive. Although entrenched managers may make decisions that damage firm value, it is 
also possible that managers from poorly performing firms choose to protect their careers and 
implement anti-takeover measures. 
Prior literature confirms that strong governance is also associated with a variety of other 
favorable firm characteristics. Chen and Chen (2012) find that firms with high board 
independence, high outside director ownership, and strong shareholder rights are associated with 
a more efficient investment allocation. Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010) find that better governance 
leads to higher liquidity through a reduction in information asymmetry, and that the improved 
liquidity also reduces the cost of equity capital for the firm. Strong governance quality can reduce 
the degree of agency costs within a firm, and thus lead to stronger performance (Core et al., 1999).  
The overall governance structure can have a significant impact on investment policy (King 
et al., 2011), which would in turn affect decisions regarding risk as well as CSR engagement. The 
literature also recognizes that governance structure significantly affects the degree of agency 
problems present in a firm. Due to the sensitivity of our main test variables to the degree of agency 
problems, as well as their existing relations with governance, we include corporate governance in 
our research to investigate its impact on the analysis. We contribute to the literature by showing 
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how corporate governance is a meaningful channel through which CSR and risk-taking relate to 
one another.  
2.4. Ownership structure 
We next discuss the literature on ownership structure due to existing evidence of its impact 
on managerial incentives and on the relation between managers and shareholders. Recall that firms 
include stock ownership in executive compensation to encourage optimal risk-taking policies. We 
consider ownership structure to also investigate its possible impacts on CSR engagement. 
Understanding its implications can provide new insight on how it may affect the motives and 
decisions regarding risk-taking and CSR.   
Generally speaking, the distribution of ownership significantly affects the risks and 
rewards inherent in various corporate decisions. To illustrate, Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe 
the zero-agency-cost base case, where the manager is the sole owner of the firm. With 100% 
ownership, the manager has little incentive to shirk or consume excessive perquisites since he 
would bear the full cost of such activities. Instead, his complete ownership would motivate him to 
focus all activities to the success of the firm and reap all benefits as a result. However, if the owner 
hires an outsider to manage the day-to-day operations, he must now be wary of sub-optimal 
behavior from the new manager. Managers with a smaller ownership in the firm are more likely to 
shirk or exert less effort in creating value for the owners (Jensen et al., 1976). Byrd et al. (1998) 
argue that increasing the level of managerial ownership is the most direct method of aligning the 
interests of managers and shareholders. Since changes in stock price would affect the manager’s 
wealth in much the same way as it would affect shareholders’, increased ownership can encourage 
managers to work harder, set longer investment horizons, and make better investment decisions.  
However, it is important to note that increasing the level of managerial ownership does not 
always lead to stronger commitment to shareholder interests. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
report a non-monotonic relationship between inside ownership and firm value. They find that at 
low levels of ownership, an increase in ownership leads to greater firm value. However, at high 
levels of ownership, they find that the same increase reduces firm value. A possible explanation 
for the hump-shaped curve is that at low levels of ownership, the incentive alignment effect of 
share value dominates, and the manager is more motivated to drive up firm value. However, firms 
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with a high level of managerial ownership may suffer from entrenchment-related issues and may 
consequently experience a drop in value. Stulz (1988) describes how sufficiently high levels of 
ownership can allow managers to shield themselves from the firm’s monitoring and governance 
mechanisms as well as threats from the takeover market.  
Adverse effects due to minimal ownership can also be observed from the shareholders 
themselves. Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) report that the severity of agency problems increases with 
the number of non-manager shareholders. They attribute this to the “free-rider problem”, where 
each individual shareholder holds such a small stake in the company that they cannot justify 
incurring monitoring costs. As the number of shareholders grows, the cost of monitoring stays 
relatively the same while the benefits are dispersed among the numerous owners. 
Empirical evidence provided by Ang et al. (2000) supports previous studies. They find that 
higher agency costs are associated with low managerial ownership among small firms.  Their 
research was extended by Singh and Davidson (2003) who report consistent results among large 
US firms. However, the conclusion holds only with respect to asset utilization, but not with respect 
to discretionary expenditures. Low inside ownership is also linked to high CEO compensation 
(Core et al., 1999). Combining this with evidence that high CEO compensation is closely related 
to greater agency problems and poor performance (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999), we 
observe another link between low ownership and its consequences. 
The extant literature provides ample evidence of the implications of ownership structure. 
Varying distributions of ownership can determine control rights and incentives among the 
participants of the firm. Manipulating managerial ownership is a common method for mitigating 
risk-aversion. We also account for the likelihood that this alignment of incentives can influence 
the implementation of CSR policies. Thus we include ownership structure as a part of our analysis. 
 
2.5. Endogeneity 
Endogeneity appears to be a very prevalent problem. Chenhall and Moers (2007) argue that 
not a single empirical paper is completely free of endogeneity issues, especially those that are 
involved in accounting, finance, and economics. This poses a serious problem for researchers, as 
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estimates derived from OLS in this context are rendered unreliable for accurate inference. Prior 
literature strongly suggests that our attempt to explain risk-taking through CSR and corporate 
governance will suffer from endogeneity issues. This is due to empirical evidence that indicates 
that governance has a causal effect on both CSR, an explanatory variable, and risk-taking, the 
explained variable. Thus we discuss the presence and the implications of endogeneity in this 
subsection by outlining its context, sources, consequences, and common remedies. 
Simply put, any model containing one or more explanatory variables that are endogenous 
will suffer from endogeneity. A variable is endogenous if its values are determined from within 
the model, while it is exogenous if it affects endogenous variables but its values are determined 
from outside the model. From an econometric perspective, a variable is endogenous if it shares a 
non-zero correlation with the structural error term. Because endogeneity violates key assumptions 
of ordinary least squares, the use of this method will yield estimates that are biased and 
inconsistent. To elaborate, OLS, by definition, adjusts the estimator in order to minimize the 
squared residuals, resulting in a zero correlation between explanatory variables and the error term. 
However, if a correlation indeed exists, the adjustment of estimates is inaccurate and hence 
introduces bias.  
A frequent cause of endogeneity is the omitted variable problem, which is closely related 
to the concept of unobserved heterogeneity. This problem occurs when there is some variable that 
is not included in the regression model but which has a significant influence on both independent 
and dependent variables. The most common way to address this problem is through the use of 
instrumental variables (Brown, Beekes, and Verhoeven, 2011), which are correlated with the 
explanatory variables but uncorrelated with the omitted variables (Chenhall et al., 2007). An 
additional solution is to include a variety of control variables to serve as proxies of the unobserved 
variable (Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke, 2012). 
Simultaneity is another common source of endogeneity within models. This issue arises 
when at least one independent variable is jointly determined with the outcome variable. In other 
words, causality between explanatory and explained variables runs in both directions. This would 
mean the error term is correlated with the explanatory variable, and that OLS estimates would 
exhibit simultaneity bias.  
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Instrumental variables can again be used to resolve simultaneity issues (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010), in conjunction with simultaneous equations using the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) approach. Alternatively, the system of equations can be simultaneously estimated via 
three-stage least squares (3SLS), introduced by Zellner and Theil (1962). Similar to Coles et al. 
(2006), we use simultaneous equation modeling to address the endogeneity in our model. A more 
detailed discussion of the model can be found in section 5.2. 
3. Hypothesis development 
3.1. The association between CSR and risk-taking  
In this study, we anticipate three distinct possibilities regarding the association between 
CSR and risk-taking. When viewing CSR at the aggregate level (i.e., combining the various CSR 
dimensions), the first possibility is that risk-taking is completely independent from CSR. In other 
words, the null hypothesis is that there is no relation between the two main variables. The second 
possibility is that CSR performance is inversely related to risk-taking, while the last possibility is 
that CSR performance is positively associated with risk-taking. We proceed with the hypothesis 
development by introducing theory and evidence in support of the different possible relationships. 
Stakeholder theory, proposed by R. Edward Freeman in 1984, suggests that corporations 
must consider the welfare of all stakeholders throughout their operations. The firms must align the 
interests of customers, suppliers, employees, communities, and the environment with those of their 
shareholders in order to achieve long-term success and sustainability. The conflict-resolution 
hypothesis stems from this theory. According to this hypothesis, managers can achieve enhanced 
firm value by undertaking CSR activities, thereby reducing conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and stakeholders. More importantly, it implies that the manager makes CSR 
investments with the motive of increasing firm value rather than his self-interest. If this explanation 
is valid, we would observe a positive association between CSR and risk-taking since both variables 
would be aligned with shareholder interests. 
 Kim, Park, and Wier (2012) find that CSR firms exhibit enhanced reliability and 
transparency in their financial reports. These firms are less likely to engage in earnings 
management, and the executives of the firms are less likely to be subject to SEC investigations 
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regarding GAAP violations. These results support the “transparent financial reporting hypothesis”, 
which posits that managers engage in CSR activities in an effort to be honest, trustworthy, and 
ethical. It is likely that such managers would demonstrate the same integrity towards their other 
duties, such as those to their shareholders. In this context, a higher degree of risk-taking is expected 
from managers who engage in CSR.  
CSR has also been found to be associated with increased firm value (Jiao, 2010; Jo and 
Harjoto, 2012). Because risk-taking is empirically linked to firm growth (John et al., 2008), a 
positive association between CSR and risk-taking can partially explain the mechanism through 
which CSR ultimately leads to enhanced firm value. The preceding evidence leads us to our first 
research hypothesis: 
H1a: There is a positive association between aggregate-level CSR performance and risk-taking.  
 
However, counterarguments also exist in the literature. From an agency perspective, 
asymmetric information can allow managers to make certain investments that are not necessarily 
in the shareholders’ best interest. Barnea and Rubin (2010) illustrate the “overinvestment 
hypothesis”, which suggests that if CSR initiatives do not maximize firm value, they are a waste 
of valuable resources that adversely affect the firm. In addition, overconfidence in managers can 
lead them to over-invest, sometimes in value-destroying investments (Malmendier and Tate 2005; 
Goel and Thakor, 2008). The managers, however, may still knowingly undertake such propositions 
in order to gain the associated reputational benefits (Preston and O’Bannon 1997).  
Engaging in CSR practices based on opportunistic incentives make it more likely that 
managers mislead shareholders as to the value of the firm and financial performance (Kim et al., 
2012). This self-serving behavior and pursuit of private benefits indicate noncompliance to their 
obligation to shareholder interests, and is consistent with a conservative risk policy (Parrino et al., 
2005; John et al., 2008). Thus we arrive at our alternative hypothesis: 
H1b: There is a negative association between aggregate-level CSR performance and risk-taking 
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3.2. CSR dimensions relative to risk-taking 
Although many studies condense social performance into a single net-value measure, it 
must be recognized that CSR is a broad term that encompasses a wide spectrum of activities. These 
activities can be further organized into several dimensions, such as community involvement, 
human rights, and environmental stewardship, among others. These “CSR dimensions must be 
examined individually in order to get an accurate picture of their impacts on various firm 
characteristics” (Bouslah et al., 2013). Our study heeds this advice to account for the strong 
possibility that the diverse dimensions share a non-uniform association with firm risk-taking.  
Several studies decompose CSR scores into the individual components for analysis. The 
separate dimensions have been investigated in their relation to idiosyncratic risk (Bouslah et al., 
2013), systematic risk (Oikonomou et al., 2012), the cost of equity capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011), 
and firm value (Jiao, 2010), among others. Between these studies, the dimensions of employee 
relations and environment feature quite prominently in their significant associations with their 
respective outcome variables. These outcome variables, or firm characteristics, all share 
established direct or indirect connections with risk-taking. All of the prior evidence suggests that 
the same three CSR dimensions are likely to share a significant association with managerial risk-
taking.  
For instance, the “employee relations” dimension has been found to have a negative 
association with risk-taking, via firm leverage (Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010). Employees of 
liquidating companies face particularly high losses including income and non-pecuniary benefits. 
Firms that showed more concern for employee welfare exhibited less risk-taking, reducing the 
probability of default and bankruptcy. Employees and labor unions have also been known to 
strongly oppose high corporate risk-taking for the sake of job security (John et al., 2008). Bouslah 
et al. (2013) find consistent empirical evidence by reporting a negative relation between employee 
relations ratings and an alternative measure of risk-taking, specifically idiosyncratic risk.  
On the other hand, there is evidence that suggests a positive association between the 
“environment” dimension and risk-taking.  The dynamic equilibrium model by Heinkel et al. 
(2001) illustrates that as the proportion of green investors increases, risk-sharing among the 
shareholders of polluting firms decreases. This leads to an increased cost of capital for the polluting 
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firms, which at a sufficient degree will motivate such firms to reform their operations. Their 
improved environmental performance can restore their cost of capital to lower levels, which would 
be conducive to risk-taking (Parrino et al., 2005). Empirical evidence has confirmed that higher 
environment ratings are associated with a lower cost of equity (El Ghoul et al., 2011) and greater 
firm value (Jiao, 2010). Based on previously established relationships of risk-taking with the cost 
of equity and firm value, it would be consistent to conjecture that higher environment ratings are 
positively related to managerial risk-taking. 
In general, the literature suggests that performance within each dimension carries with it 
its own unique set of motives, circumstances, and intended outcomes, and accordingly may have 
a unique association with risk-taking. By considering the complexity and multi-faceted nature of 
managerial incentives and motives regarding risk choices, we account for the possibility that 
investing in different dimensions of CSR has different directions and degrees of association with 
corporate risk-taking. We establish the null hypothesis that each CSR dimension shares no relation 
with risk-taking. We also consider that each dimension may be negatively or positively associated 
with risk-taking. Based on the preceding evidence, we introduce the next research hypothesis: 
H2a: There is a negative association between the performance in the employee relations 
dimension and risk-taking. 
H2b: There is a positive association between the performance in the environment 
dimension and risk-taking. 
 
3.3. Governance practice’s effect on the association between CSR and risk-taking 
In addition, we investigate the impact of governance quality on the association between 
CSR and risk-taking. As previously discussed, CSR engagement and risk-taking are both results 
of managerial decisions. We account for the differences in corporate governance since governance 
structure defines the rights and restrictions between shareholders and managers (Gompers et al., 
2003), and therefore has a significant influence on managers’ decisions and how they run the firm. 
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Prior literature suggests a positive relation between governance quality and CSR 
performance. Under the conflict resolution hypothesis of stakeholder theory, CSR engagement is 
a value-maximizing activity that is consistent with shareholder interests. Since effective 
governance increases the likelihood that firm decisions maximize shareholders’ wealth (Aggarwal 
et al., 2008), we would expect to see CSR increase with governance quality.  
Empirical evidence supports this assessment. La Porta et al. (2002) argue that strong legal 
protection of investors facilitates the development and reliability of financial markets, allowing 
easier access to external capital for firms pursuing growth. Their results indicate a positive relation 
between investor protection and firm value. Jiao (2010), on the other hand, presents evidence that 
firm value also increases with CSR performance. Taken together, the studies imply a mutually 
positive relation between governance quality, CSR, and firm value. Jo et al. (2012) empirically 
confirms this presumed relation between the three variables. They first establish a positive and 
causal effect of governance on CSR, and then proceed to determine that this association is linked 
with increased valuation. 
In terms of risk-taking, strong governance can mitigate agency costs by decreasing 
managerial risk-aversion (John et al., 2008). Excessive risk-aversion presents a serious opportunity 
cost to investors, as managers will tend to reject risky yet value-enhancing investments (Hirshleifer 
et al., 1992). High governance quality can adjust the manager’s incentives and induce him to take 
on greater risks. Governance provisions not only protect investors by limiting managerial shirking 
and empire-building (Bebchuk et al., 2006), but also facilitate shareholder participation and 
enforce discipline on the board and management (Baber et al., 2012). Previous studies strongly 
suggest that such discipline would include increasing the risk appetite of otherwise risk-averse 
managers, and hence suggests a positive association between governance quality and risk-taking 
(La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2002; Parrino et al., 2005; John et al., 2008).  
In summary, the prior literature illustrates the importance of accounting for corporate 
governance in this study. Governance has been shown to share significant and positive relations 
with both CSR and risk-taking, and its inclusion is vital for accurate and reliable results. The 
preceding evidence leads us to our last research hypothesis: 
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H3: Firms with high governance quality exhibit a positive and strong relation between 
aggregate-level CSR performance and risk-taking 
The corresponding null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the CSR-risk-taking 
association among firms with high governance quality relative to those with low governance 
quality. 
 
4. Data, sample selection, and variables 
In this section we describe the data used in the investigation of CSR’s relation to risk-
taking, in addition to endogeneity concerns arising from the inclusion of corporate governance 
measures. 
4.1. Data and sample selection 
We use multiple databases to construct our sample. Compustat and CRSP are used to 
compute proxies for risk-taking as well as several firm-specific control variables. CSR 
performance is evaluated using KLD STAT, while measures of governance quality are obtained 
from RiskMetrics. Because KLD offers data beginning from 1991, we use this date as our starting 
year and collect available data up to 2013.  
We focus only on US firms for several reasons. First, the concept of CSR has been 
promoted and researched for many decades (Heinkel et al., 2001) and is thus more developed, 
integrated, and widely accepted in the US relative to other countries. Financial contributions 
toward ESG objectives are much greater in the US than those of Europe, while remaining 
continents hold moderate to little value for social responsibility (Wang et al., 2013). In addition, 
the United States is an environment of very strong investor protection and political constraints, 
both of which are conducive to firm growth and risk-taking behavior (Aggarwal et al., 2003; 
Boubakri et al., 2013). Strong investor protection curbs management’s ability to divert corporate 
resources for self-serving ends, leading to more value-generating risky investments (John et al., 
2008). Meanwhile, effective political constraints encourage risk-taking by reducing the probability 
of government interference and expropriation. The preceding evidence, as well as the fact that the 
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United States has one of the best corporate governance systems in the world (Shleifer et al. 1997), 
makes the US a strong choice for this investigation. Consistent with prior literature, financial and 
utility firms (SIC code 6000-6999 and 4900-4999, respectively) are excluded as they operate under 
unique regulations and have different financial reporting characteristics.  
We begin with an initial sample of risk-taking measures derived from Compustat and 
CRSP. We proceed to merge this set with available KLD STAT data as well as several firm-
specific control variables. After cleaning for missing values, we obtain our final sample of panel 
data in preparation for multivariate analysis. The final sample of risk-taking proxies, CSR 
performance measures, and control variables consist of 10,106 firm-year observations across 1,959 
firms from 1995 to 2009. The sample ends at 2009 due to the method used to compute the two 
accounting-based proxies for risk-taking. To compute the proxy for year t, the method requires 
there to be available data for the following four years, or t + 4. Thus 2009 is the upper limit for 
the proxies, as there is currently no data beyond that of 2013.  
We conduct subsequent sample construction in preparation for simultaneous equation 
modeling (SEM). Indices measuring governance quality as well as additional control variables are 
introduced into the sample in accordance with existing theoretical associations. The new additions 
lead to a reduction in sample size due to the limited nature of the RiskMetrics governance data. 
The resulting final sample for SEM consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 
1998 to 2009. Table 1 displays the sample distribution by year and industry on the key variables. 
Panel A provides information on the sample used for multivariate regression analysis, while Panel 
B is for the sample used in subsequent simultaneous equation modeling. 
Table 1 indicates that the samples are primarily composed of firms in the manufacturing 
industry. Manufacturing firms make up more than half the sample size in both panels. The next 
largest subsample groups are the service and public administration industries, however they consist 
of significantly fewer observations than those of manufacturing. 
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Table 1. Sample distribution by year and industry 
  Industry (first two digits of the SIC code) 
  
Agriculture, 
forestry, and 
fisheries 
Mineral 
industries and 
construction 
Manu-
facturing 
Transportation 
and 
communications 
Wholesale 
trade and 
retail trade 
Service 
industries 
Public 
Admini-
stration 
Total 
Year (01-09) (10-17) (20-39) (40-48) (50-59) (70-89) (91-99)   
Panel A: Sample for multivariate regression analysis 
1995 0 17 155 13 27 13 1 226 
1996 0 16 159 12 27 16 1 231 
1997 0 15 174 15 32 16 1 253 
1998 0 15 179 17 36 18 1 266 
1999 0 16 186 17 41 17 1 278 
2000 0 19 197 18 45 24 1 304 
2001 1 41 301 38 66 65 1 513 
2002 1 39 293 33 80 65 1 512 
2003 5 88 650 79 145 175 4 1,146 
2004 6 86 665 86 154 192 4 1,193 
2005 5 97 654 93 164 199 3 1,215 
2006 5 109 657 99 177 209 3 1,259 
2007 6 112 685 117 174 223 3 1,320 
2008 6 119 700 108 173 235 3 1,344 
2009 0 0 29 1 6 10 0 46 
Total 35 789 5,684 746 1,347 1,477 28 10,106 
Panel B: Sample for simultaneous equation modeling 
1998 0 10 134 14 30 10 0 198 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 15 155 14 31 16 0 231 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 24 215 18 51 38 0 346 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 43 338 31 85 78 2 577 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 42 332 36 97 82 1 591 
2007 1 48 352 42 102 98 0 643 
2008 3 50 384 40 108 107 0 692 
2009 0 0 20 0 4 8 0 32 
Total 5 232 1930 195 508 437 3 3,310 
This table provides the sample distributions by year and industry. Panel A pertains to a sample of 10,106 firm-year observations 
across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Panel B pertains to a sample of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 
1998 to 2009. The number of firm-year observations are reported for each year in the sample and across all industries 
designated by the two-digit SIC code. 
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Panel A of Table 1 shows that the number of observations increases with time. This 
increasing trend is likely due to the expansion of coverage of the KLD dataset. The last year of the 
sample, however, indicates a very small number of observations. This is likely caused by the 
method of computing Risk1 and Risk2, which is discussed in detail in section 4.3. The method 
requires there to be data up to 2013. Since the computation took place within that year, the 
availability of data was limited for a significant portion of the sample, thereby reducing the number 
of observations for that year.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows a similar rising trend in the number of observations over time, 
however years 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005 report zero observations. This is due to the inclusion 
of corporate governance variables into the sample. RiskMetrics, the source of the governance data, 
does not offer data in every single year, resulting in missing values and subsequent deletion of 
those firm-year observations. 
Our sample size differs from that of Bouslah et al. (2013), who conduct a related study. 
Though their study uses the KLD dataset and a comparable time period range, their sample consists 
of 16,599 firm-year observations while ours consist of 10,106. This is due to our use of a greater 
number of risk proxies. Bouslah et al. (2013) investigate the association between the KLD dataset 
and two measures of firm risk, total and idiosyncratic. In contrast, our study examines four diverse 
measures of risk-taking. Though this contributes to the thoroughness and robustness of the 
analysis, it also inevitably results in some missing values among the various proxies. 
The following subsections provide detailed explanations on the computation of the 
variables used in this research. 
4.2. Measuring CSR 
To measure social performance, we utilize the KLD STAT database, currently owned by 
MSCI. KLD STAT, which stands for Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Statistical Tool for 
Analyzing Trends in Social & Environmental Performance, is an independent ESG ratings service 
founded in 1988 that employs their own research staff with industry and issue specialties. The 
database’s coverage started with the S&P 500 and the DS400 indices, however it has subsequently 
expanded to include the Broad Market Social Index as well as the 3000 largest US publicly traded 
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companies by market capitalization. KLD STAT compiles its ratings every year at calendar year-
end by examining public documents such as annual reports, company websites, CSR reports, and 
government agencies. They also monitor media sources to follow developing issues.  
We use KLD STAT due to its established reliability and widespread use in ESG research. 
The database is “widely accepted by practitioners and academics as an objective measure of 
corporate social responsibility” (Goss and Roberts, 2011), while Jiao (2010) describes it as “one 
of the best data sources for corporate social performance to date.”  
The ratings can be divided into two chief categories: qualitative issue areas and 
controversial business issues. Qualitative issue areas are organized by the separate CSR 
dimensions, including product characteristics, human rights, environment, employee relations, 
diversity, community, and corporate governance. Each dimension comes with a unique set of 
strengths and concerns, whereby KLD administers a binary rating. A “1” is given if a firm exhibits 
a particular strength or concern, and a “0” otherwise. Controversial business issues include alcohol, 
gambling, tobacco, firearms, military, and nuclear power. These issues come with a unique set of 
concerns, but not strengths. Consistent with prior literature, we exclude the controversial business 
issues in our analysis due to its inherent differences from the qualitative issue areas. Similarly, we 
also exclude the corporate governance dimension as our definition of CSR does not include 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.  
Various methods based on prior literature are used to measure CSR. The first method, in 
being consistent with traditional measures using KLD, uses the net aggregate value by taking the 
total number of indicated strengths and subtracting the total number of indicated concerns for each 
company for every year (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012). This proxy, hereafter referred to 
as CSR_net, provides a comprehensive, single-value measure of social performance for each firm-
year observation. 
However, the use of aggregate measures may confound the effects of individual dimensions 
that are not equally important or relevant (Bouslah et al., 2013). Hence, the next method is to 
compute the disaggregate values of social performance by keeping separate all of the different 
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CSR dimensions. We do so by computing the number of indicated strengths minus the number of 
indicated concerns within each dimension.  
Other methods for measuring CSR exist within the literature. Mattingly and Berman (2006) 
advise that KLD strengths and concerns are empirically and conceptually distinct concepts and 
that they do not measure opposite sides of a common underlying construct. Strike et al. (2006) 
similarly argue that positive and negative social actions are not simply the reverse reflections of 
each other such that both deserve their own separate examination. Their study finds that firms are 
commonly involved in both socially responsible as well as reprehensible activities.  Bouslah et al. 
(2013) find that CSR strengths share unique associations to idiosyncratic risk compared to 
concerns. The prior evidence suggests that net measures that combine both strengths and concerns 
may result in a loss of important information. Thus we repeat the analyses while keeping separate 
all KLD strengths and concerns. We follow Oikonomou et al. (2012) and Bouslah et al. (2013) in 
computing the appropriate scores. For each dimension, we compute the strength score as the total 
number of indicated strengths divided by the total number of possible strengths, yielding a 
proportional value. An aggregate strength score is also computed by taking the average of all 
dimensional strength scores. We follow the same process for concerns. 
It is important to note that due to its binary nature, KLD follows a cardinal system. Ratings 
only indicate whether firms meet predetermined criteria, and give no information on the degree of 
their strengths or concerns or on the actual dollar expenditure invested in such actions. This comes 
with important implications in terms of analysis and interpretation. A firm with a rating of “4” 
does not necessarily mean it engages in twice as much CSR activities as does a firm with a rating 
of “2”. In the context of regression analysis, a positive and significant loading on a proxy for CSR 
indicates only the association between the dependent variable and KLD’s particular rating system. 
One may interpret this to mean that further investments toward CSR will relate to an increase in 
the dependent variable only in the measure that KLD observes such actions and awards additional 
points. It does not account for the amount of corporate resources dedicated to CSR or whether such 
activities are profitable. We recognize and acknowledge the limitations of the CSR dataset in order 
to avoid drawing flawed or inaccurate conclusions. Nevertheless, we proceed with KLD due to its 
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strong reputation for reliability and accuracy as well as its prevalence throughout academic 
research. 
4.3. Measuring risk-taking 
We utilize data from Compustat and CRSP to construct our proxies for managerial risk-
taking. Compustat North America is a database that offers fundamental financial and market 
information on active and inactive publicly held companies across US and Canada. They cover 
over 300 annual data items from income statement, balance sheet, statement of cash flows, and 
supplemental data items. CRSP, on the other hand, provides a wealth of data pertaining to security 
price, return, and trade volume on the major stock exchanges. They also offer stock indices, mutual 
funds, treasury bond and risk-free rates, and real estate data. 
We employ a diverse assortment of risk-taking proxies. The first two proxies, Risk1 and 
Risk2, are purely accounting-based measures, while the expected default frequency (hereafter 
EDF) incorporates both accounting and market data. Idiosyncratic risk is composed of solely 
market information via stock returns and overall market trends. By capturing risk-taking from 
different angles, we strengthen the comprehensive nature of our analysis. We proceed to describe 
each proxy in detail. 
 
4.3.1. Risk1: Volatility of corporate profits 
High risk corporate operations yield more volatile returns to capital. Thus, we use the 
market-adjusted volatility of firm-level corporate profits as the first measure of risk-taking, 
following John et al. (2008), Faccio et al. (2011), and Boubakri et al. (2013). Profits is measured 
as the firm’s operating return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) scaled by total assets. Using the market-adjusted 
values helps us arrive at a “cleaner measure of the level of risk resulting from corporate operation 
decisions” (Faccio et al., 2011). Risk1 is computed as follows: 
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Nt indexes the firms within the sample at year t, while Ai,t denotes the total assets of firm i 
within the same year. For every firm that has available assets and earnings data for at least five 
subsequent years, we compute Ei,t, defined in Eq. (2) as the deviation of EBITDA/Assets ratio from 
the sample average within the corresponding year. Finally, we take the standard deviation of the 
current and next four years’ measures of Ei,t to obtain Risk1i,t. This proxy indicates the volatility 
of firm-level corporate profits in the following years that are presumed to be the result of the 
current year’s managerial decision-making, as influenced by varying risk-appetites. 
 
4.3.2. Risk2: Earnings gap 
The next accounting-based proxy for risk-taking provides an alternate measure of the 
spread of earnings that a company experiences. It is obtained by taking the difference between the 
maximum and the minimum of Ei,t over a five year period (Faccio et al., 2011; Boubakri et al., 
2013). Risk2 is computed as follows:  
( ) ( ), , ,2i t i t i tRISK Max E Min E= −    (3) 
 The two accounting-based measures of risk-taking, Risk1 and Risk2, come with certain 
limitations. First, they are both influenced by the conservatism principle, which often causes asset 
values to be understated in relation to their market values (Hillegeist et al., 2004). Second, 
accounting-based variables are exposed to possible insider manipulation (Faccio et al., 2011). 
Earnings management and insider appropriation of corporate earnings could conceal the true risk-
taking tendencies of the managers (John et al., 2008). Fortunately, our sample focuses on US firms, 
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whose cash flow data are subject to less earnings management than those of other countries (Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). 
 
4.3.3. Expected default frequency (EDF): 
We next introduce two market-based measures of managerial risk-taking. The first market-
based measure, the expected default frequency, is defined as the probability that a firm will default 
on its debt obligations, or more specifically that a firm’s assets at a given time is less than the book 
value of the firm’s liabilities. The EDF is described as the most widely used market-based risk 
metric (Das, Hanouna, and Sarin, 2009) and has been empirically determined to be superior in its 
predictive abilities relative to similar accounting-based measures (Hillegeist et al., 2004).  
The EDF serves as a proxy for managerial risk-taking from a market perspective. John et 
al., (2008) argues that ceteris paribus, managers prefer to divert corporate resources for their own 
private benefit. This motive is better served when cash flows are even and more predictable. 
Conservative risk policies are conducive to maintaining such cash flows. On the other hand, higher 
risk-taking means investing in potentially profitable projects that inevitably result in a high 
volatility of cash flows. By allowing the possibility of low cash flow states, the manager also risks 
the firm’s ability to meet its debt obligations. Undertaking any project that increases a firm’s risk 
increases the probability of default (Parrino et al., 2005). Furthermore, the riskiness of a firm’s 
investments is strongly related to its credit rating (Verwijmeren et al., 2010), which in turn serves 
as an indicator of its default probability. The prior evidence illustrates that a manager willing to 
take greater risks for the sake of firm growth must make decisions that unavoidably increase the 
firm’s likelihood of default. Thus the EDF serves as a suitable measure of managerial risk-taking.  
 The EDF has significant advantages compared to similar accounting-based measures. 
Primarily, the EDF incorporates a measure of asset volatility. Hillegeist et al. (2004) explain that 
“volatility is a crucial variable in bankruptcy prediction because it captures the likelihood that the 
value of the firm’s assets will decline to such an extent that the firm will be unable to repay its 
debts. Ceteris paribus, the probability of bankruptcy is increasing with volatility.” They further 
discuss that market-based measures combine information from a variety of sources in addition to 
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financial statements, and are free from the influence of the conservatism principle that affects its 
accounting-based counterparts. As a result, the EDF provides an important angle to our analysis.  
 Our measure of the EDF is computed following the method of Bharath and Shumway 
(2008), which is similar to that of Vassalou and Xing (2004). It uses Merton’s theoretical model 
in which the equity of a firm is viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets while the strike price 
is the book value of the firm’s liabilities. In this context, the value of equity is zero when the firm’s 
assets are less than the strike price, consistent with the condition that shareholders are residual 
claimants only after all other obligations have been met. The model is illustrated in the following 
Black and Scholes (1973) formula for call options. 
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 VE denotes the firm’s equity, or market capitalization, while VA and σA denote the value and 
the volatility of the firm’s assets, respectively. X represents the book value of debt, r the risk-free 
rate, and T the time to expiration.  
 By utilizing Ito’s lemma and the Black-Scholes-Merton model, we arrive at the relation 
between the volatility of the firm’s assets and that of its equity, denoted as Eσ . 
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    (6)  
 The values of the firm’s equity and associated volatility can be easily computed using 
historical stock price data. However, the market value and the volatility of the firm’s assets must 
be inferred. This is accomplished by solving a system of non-linear equations using an iterative 
procedure. Solving for equations (4) and (6) yield numerical values for VA and σA. The distance to 
default (DD) can then be calculated as 
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where µ denotes the estimated expected return of the firm’s assets. Default occurs when the log 
value in the numerator is negative, or in other words, when the value of assets is less than that of 
the debt. Finally, we arrive at the implied probability of default derived from the DD measure. 
( )tEDF N DD= −     (8) 
 The EDF has its own limitations as a risk-taking proxy, some which also applies to the 
idiosyncratic risk measure discussed in the following subsection. First, the EDF may be limited by 
both model misspecification and measurement errors (Hillegeist et al., 2004). Certain input 
variables, such as the expected market return on assets and the expected level of volatility, contain 
error since they are estimated using historical data. Second, the market-based measures implicitly 
assume that markets are efficient and well-informed (Hillegeist et al., 2004). This assumption was 
notably contradicted following the notorious Enron scandal. Moody’s KMV, which uses a measure 
closely related to the EDF, assigned Enron a significantly lower probability of default relative to 
standard ratings when their stock price was artificially high. Only when Enron’s accounting 
problems became known did the stock price fall, which was subsequently reflected in the KMV 
measure.   
 
4.3.4. Idiosyncratic risk 
 Idiosyncratic risk is the firm-specific risk that is uncorrelated with the overall market risk. 
It is also known as diversifiable risk, as it can be nullified through holding a diversified portfolio 
of stocks.  
 Managers have the discretion to change the level of idiosyncratic risk through the selection 
of investment projects (Low, 2009). Pastor and Veronesi (2003) find that this measure increases 
with the level of uncertainty regarding future profitability and the volatility of cash flows. 
However, projects that increase the idiosyncratic variance of the firm also enhance the value of 
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equity, thereby serving shareholder interests (Cao, Simin, Zhao, 2006). According to Low (2009), 
“firm risk summarizes the net effect of all managerial risk-taking activities, including some that 
cannot be easily measured by the econometrician, and thus provides a more accurate portrayal of 
managerial risk-taking behavior.” Furthermore, she finds a significant association between 
idiosyncratic risk and the amount of leverage and R&D expenditures, both of which are used in 
the literature as alternative proxies for managerial risk-taking (Verwijmeren et al., 2010; Coles et 
al., 2006). It can be seen that idiosyncratic risk is related to managerial decisions, volatile 
profitability, and shareholder interests in much the same way as risk-taking in general is described 
throughout the literature. The prior evidence strongly supports the assessment that idiosyncratic 
risk is an appropriate proxy for managerial risk-taking. 
 To compute the proxy, daily data on excess returns is obtained from CRSP. We follow 
Pathan et al., (2009) and Bouslah et al., (2013) by taking the standard deviation of the residuals 
from the four-factor Carhart (1997) model. 
( )it ft i iM Mt ft iS t iH t iU t itR R R R SMB HML UMDα α α α α ε− = + − + + + +  (9) 
 The left-hand-side denotes the excess return for firm i at day t. Similarly, ( )Mt ftR R−
denotes the excess return on the market. SMB is the difference between the returns on portfolios 
holding small vs. big capitalization stocks. HML is the difference between the returns on portfolios 
holding stocks with high vs. low book-to-market ratios. UMD is the difference between the returns 
on portfolios holding stocks with high vs. low prior returns.  ε represents the error term, assumed 
to be independently and identically distributed and having a zero mean and constant variance. We 
estimate the idiosyncratic risk by taking the standard deviation of ε using daily data over the past 
year. We repeat this process for each firm-year observation in order to obtain a time-varying proxy 
for risk-taking.  
 
4.4. Measuring corporate governance 
Data for measuring governance quality is obtained from RiskMetrics ISS Governance 
Services. Governance information was initially provided to WRDS by the IRRC (Investor 
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Responsibility Research Center) until their acquisition by ISS in 2005. The transition caused 
minimal disruption until the decision by the organization to modify the data collection 
methodology to follow ISS specifications. Thus, RiskMetrics offers governance information in 
two different datasets: The Governance Legacy that maintains the original IRRC methodology and 
the current database that employs the ISS methodology. Moderate examination and modifications 
were required before appending the two into one consolidated governance dataset.  
The IRRC was originally a non-profit organization founded in 2006 that funded research 
in environmental, social, and governance issues. They released periodic publications that compile 
information on a wide assortment of corporate governance provisions across more than 2000 firms. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) used this database to construct their well-known Governance 
Index (G-Index), which consists of 24 governance provisions that measure the extent of a firm’s 
takeover defenses, or entrenchment. They find that deeply entrenched firms are associated with 
lower stock returns and firm value.  
Bebchuk et al. (2006), however, find that the approach of including a large number of 
provisions in the index is misguided. The ISS offer data on over 60 different governance provisions 
while Governance Metric International offers over 600. Bebchuk et al. (2006) hypothesize that 
only a small subset of provisions is significantly related to firm characteristics, and that the 
majority are likely irrelevant or an endogenous product of others. Thus they construct the E-Index 
(Entrenchment Index), consisting of only six governance provisions found within the G-Index. 
These six provisions were chosen based on their theoretical association with firm value in addition 
to the strong opposition expressed by institutional investors towards their implementation. Results 
indicate that the six chosen provisions fully drive the association with firm value and stock returns, 
while the remaining provisions exhibited no significance. Because entrenchment can have adverse 
effects on management behavior and incentives (Bebchuk et al., 2006), we include the E-Index in 
our analysis. In doing so, we focus only on the provisions that matter and avoid giving weight to 
other provisions of little to no significance. 
The original authors construct the E-Index by awarding one point for the presence of each 
of the six anti-takeover provisions within a firm-year observation. Thus, the index increases with 
the degree of managerial entrenchment and decreases with the ability of outsider intervention, or 
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external governance quality. For ease of interpretation following analysis, we follow Baber et al. 
(2006) and invert the index such that it shares a positive relation with external governance quality.  
We also include a measure of board characteristics in order to account for internal 
governance quality. Prior literature strongly suggests that board size and independence are 
important determinants of effective monitoring and thus can influence the level of agency costs 
resulting from managerial decisions. Large boards tend to become less focused on monitoring the 
managerial process (Jensen, 1993) and may have significantly more free-rider and communication 
issues (Brown et al., 2006). Yermack (1996) finds that larger boards are associated with lower 
market valuation. Core et al. (1999) provides consistent evidence via CEO compensation. They 
find that firms with larger boards as well as those where the CEO is also the chairman are 
associated with much higher CEO compensation, which is positively related to the severity of 
agency problems. We also investigate the effect of board independence, as outside directors are 
presumed to provide more rigorous oversight. We follow Baber et al. (2012) in utilizing the B-
Index, which consists of six characteristics that measure the quality of internal governance.  
Data for the B-Index is obtained from RiskMetric’s Directors Database, which offers a 
variety of information on board of director characteristics, such as director age, independence, and 
membership on various committees. Similar to the E-Index, one point is awarded for the 
fulfillment of each requirement within a firm-year observation. The requirements are: (1) more 
than two thirds of the board is composed of independent directors. (2) The audit committee is 
composed entirely of independent directors. (3) The compensation committee is composed entirely 
of independent directors. (4) There exists a separate and entirely independent nominating 
committee. (5) The board size is less than the sample median, adjusting for year and firm size. (6) 
The CEO is not the chairman of the board.  
Table 2 summarizes the provisions and board characteristics chosen to proxy for 
governance quality, while Table 3 summarizes all key variables used in the analysis. 
 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Proxies for Governance Quality 
E-Index B-Index 
(Bebchuk et al., 2006) (Baber et al., 2012) 
Staggered board Board of directors independence 
Limitation on amending bylaws Audit committee independence 
Limitation on amending the charter Compensation committee independence 
Supermajority to approve a merger Nominating committee independence 
Golden parachute Board size 
Poison pill CEO/Chairman duality 
This table lists the attributes and bylaws taken into account in the construction of the E-Index and 
the B-Index. The values of each index ranges from zero to six. For each index, one point is awarded 
for the observation of each attribute or for the existence of each bylaw, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 3. Summary of Main Variables 
Variable Database Measure Method Following 
CSR 
KLD STAT 
CSR_net: Aggregate 
net score  
Total number of indicated 
strengths minus total 
number of indicated 
concerns 
El Ghoul et al., 2011 
KLD STAT 
Disaggregate net score 
(Suffix "_net" 
following dimension 
name) 
Number of indicated 
strengths minus number of 
indicated concerns separated 
by CSR dimension 
 Bouslah et al., 2013; 
Jiao et al., 2010 
KLD STAT 
CSR_str & CSR_con: 
Aggregate strengths vs 
concerns  
Average of all dimensional 
strength scores. Same 
process for concerns. 
Oikonomou et al., 
2012; Bouslah et al., 
2013 
KLD STAT 
Disaggregate strengths 
vs concerns (Suffix 
"_str" or "_con" 
following dimension 
name) 
Number of indicated 
strengths (concerns) scaled 
by number of all possible 
strengths (concerns) for 
each dimension 
Oikonomou et al., 
2012; Bouslah et al., 
2013 
Risk-taking 
Compustat 
North America 
Risk1: Market-adjusted 
volatility of firm-level 
corporate profits 
Standard deviation of the 
market-adusted 
EBITDA/(Total Assets) 
ratio over a 5 year period 
John et al., 2008; 
Faccio et al., 2011; 
Boubakri et al., 2013 
Compustat 
North America 
Risk2: Earnings gap 
Maximum earnings minus 
minimum earnings over a 5 
year period 
Faccio et al., 2011; 
Boubakri et al., 2013 
Compustat 
North America 
and CRSP 
EDF: Expected default 
frequency 
Normal cumulative density 
function of the "distance to 
default" measure 
Bharath et al., 2008 
CRSP Idiosyncratic Risk 
Standard deviation of the 
residuals from the Carhart 
(1997) 4-factor model 
Pathan et al., 2009; 
Bouslah et al., 2013 
Governance 
Structure 
RiskMetrics Inverted E-Index 
6 governance provisions that 
measure external 
governance, or takeover 
defense 
Bebchuk et al., 2006 
RiskMetrics B-Index 
6 governance provisions that 
measure internal 
governance. 
Baber et al., 2012 
This table displays a descriptive summary of all proxies used to measure CSR, risk-taking, and governance structure. Qualitative  
Descriptions as well as the sources of the data and method are provided. 
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4.5. Control variables 
 We control for firm characteristics that have been established in prior literature to have an 
impact on our main research variables. For multivariate regression analysis, we control for firm 
size, return on assets, book-to-market ratio, leverage, sales growth, and firm age. 
 Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets in millions $US. We control 
for this variable since size captures many factors that affect corporate decisions, such as public 
visibility and resource availability. In this context, larger companies with more resources and a 
higher stake in reputational wealth should have more motivation to invest in CSR (Wang et al. 
2013; Liu et al., 2013). Large firm size may also be associated with stronger governance quality 
due to investor interest and public scrutiny (Chung et al., 2010), which may in turn affect the 
corporation’s risk policy. Prior literature on risk-taking confirms that size is an important firm 
characteristic to control for (John et al. 2008; Boubakri et al. 2013; Coles et al. 2006).  
We also control for the company’s return-on-assets (ROA), defined as earnings before 
interests, deductions, taxes, and amortization scaled by total assets at the beginning of each year. 
The ROA serves as a proxy for financial performance (Boubakri et al. 2013). Thus, firms with 
strong performance likely have more resources for CSR activities (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). In 
addition, high ROA may be due to poor management ability rather than risk-taking choices (Faccio 
et al., 2011), so the inclusion of this measure can control for differences of management quality 
across firms.  
Prior studies also include the book-to-market ratio as a control variable. The book-to-
market ratio is computed simply as the ratio between the book and market values of common 
equity (Bouslah et al. 2013). The B/M ratio can be associated with future profitability (Liu et al. 
2013) and investment opportunities (Coles et al. 2006) that may affect managerial risk-aversion.  
We also control for leverage, defined as the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. The 
amount of leverage has important implications on a firm’s riskiness and probability of success, 
and can serve as a proxy for financial health (Boubakri et al. 2013).  
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Sales growth, measured as the current year’s total sales scaled by those in the previous 
year, serves as a rough proxy for the value of growth opportunities (La Porta et al., 2002). Firms 
with high sales growth may also have more resources to invest in CSR (Jiao, 2010). We follow 
prior studies on risk-taking and include this variable in our analysis (John et al., 2008; Coles et al., 
2006; Faccio et al., 2011). 
Firm age is calculated as the natural log of 1 plus the listing age of the firm, following Kim 
and Lu (2011). The listing age is measured as the number of years since its first trade date on 
CRSP. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) find that younger firms experience higher volatility in their 
returns and profitability. We include this variable to control for differences in the life cycle of the 
firm, as riskiness may decline with age (Faccio et al., 2011). We also control for industry effects 
by including dummy variables based on the 2-digit SIC code.   
 Additional and unique variables are required for subsequent analysis using simultaneous 
equation modeling. Within the system of equations, proper specification necessitates that unique 
variables must be included in some equations while excluded from others in order to fulfill 
conditions of identification.  
We introduce liquidity and Tobin’s Q. Liquidity is proxied by the quick ratio, computed as 
the current assets scaled by current liabilities. This variable is included due to its indirect effects 
on insider ownership (Cho, 1998). Higher liquidity may indicate enhanced firm performance, 
which in turn may motivate a manager to increase his holdings to take part in the gains. Tobin’s Q 
is measured as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, (Yermack, 1996; 
La Porta et al., 2002; Gompers, 2003). The market value of assets is computed as the book value 
of assets minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes plus the market value of common 
stock. Managers may prefer more equity compensation when they expect firm value to increase.  
Tables 4 and 5 provide descriptive statistics and sample correlations, respectively. Panel A 
pertains to the sample used in multivariate regression analysis while Panel B pertains to that used 
in SEM. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of key variables 
  Variable n Mean St. Dev. Min Q1 Mdn Q3 Max 
  Panel A: Sample for multivariate regression analysis 
  Risk1 10,106 0.7 0.81 0.03 0.17 0.32 0.58 5.59 
  Risk2 10,106 1.67 1.92 0.07 0.46 0.78 1.4 13.49 
  EDF 10,106 0.02 0.09 0 0 0 0 0.95 
  Idrisk 10,106 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.15 
  CSR_net 10,106 -0.11 2.32 -9 -1 0 1 15 
  CSR_str 10,106 0.04 0.06 0 0 0.02 0.05 0.55 
  CSR_con 10,106 0.06 0.07 0 0 0.06 0.09 0.53 
  Total assets ($ millions) 10,106 5,785 13,023 60.48 538.7 1,558 4,730 96,322 
  ROA 10,106 0.13 0.16 -8.18 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.44 
  B/M 10,106 0.45 0.47 -11.2 0.23 0.38 0.59 4.73 
  Lev 10,106 0.21 0.19 0 0.06 0.18 0.3 1.41 
  Sgrowth 10,106 0.92 0.3 0 0.83 0.91 0.98 5.28 
  Age (years) 10,106 22.5 20.29 0 8 15 33 83 
  Variable n Mean St. Dev. Min Q1 Mdn Q3 Max 
  Panel B: Sample for simultaneous equation modeling 
  Risk1 3,310 0.85 0.85 0.08 0.19 0.56 0.66 2.69 
  Risk2 3,310 2.05 2.02 0.22 0.5 1.32 1.62 6.49 
  EDF 3,310 0.02 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.95 
  Idrisk 3,310 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.1 
  CSR_net 3,310 0.07 2.58 -9 -1 0 1 15 
  CSR_str 3,310 0.05 0.07 0 0 0.03 0.07 0.55 
  CSR_con 3,310 0.07 0.07 0 0 0.06 0.09 0.53 
  Inside Own 3,310 0.07 0.11 0 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.64 
  B-Index 3,310 3.95 1.42 0 3 4 5 6 
  Inv E-Index 3,310 3.59 1.5 0 3 4 5 6 
  Total assets ($ millions) 3,310 6,532 9,738 52.2 907 2,335 6,945 38,697 
  ROA 3,310 0.15 0.09 -0.86 0.11 0.15 0.2 0.44 
  B/M 3,310 0.49 0.41 -2.69 0.26 0.4 0.61 4.73 
  Lev 3,310 0.19 0.15 0 0.08 0.18 0.28 1.39 
  Sgrowth 3,310 0.93 0.21 0.12 0.85 0.92 0.98 4.71 
  Age (years) 3,310 27.6 21.0 0 12 21 36 83 
  Liquidity 3,310 2.12 1.53 0.11 1.24 1.75 2.5 21.95 
  Tobin's Q 3,310 1.96 1.26 0.44 1.22 1.6 2.25 13.94 
This table provides descriptive statistics of key variables. Panel A pertains to a sample of 10,106 firm-year 
observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Panel B pertains to a sample of 3,310 firm-year observations 
across 941 firms from 1998 to 2009. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 4 (continued). Descriptive statistics of key variables 
  Variable n Proportion of 1's 
  Panel C: Dichotomous 
variables   
  B_dum 3,804 0.41 
  InvE_dum 3,804 0.29 
  AF_dum 8,869 0.50 
  SP_dum 10,106 0.43 
This table provides descriptive statistics of key variables. Panel C pertains to 
dichotomous variables used across different tests and samples. B_dum 
(InvE_dum) takes a value of 1 if the B-Index (Inverted E-index) is greater than 
the sample median for the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. AF_dum is 
constructed the same way based on the number of analyst following. SP_dum 
takes a value of 1 if the firm has been included in the S&P 500 Index at least 
once during the sample period. 
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Table 5a. Sample correlations of key variables of multivariate analysis 
  Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk CSR_net CSR_str CSR_con Size ROA B/M Lev Sgrowth Age 
  Risk1 1                         
  Risk2 0.99 1                       
  EDF 0.05 0.05 1                     
  Idrisk 0.17 0.17 0.47 1                   
  CSR_net 0.13 0.13 -0.04 -0.08 1                 
  CSR_str 0.15 0.15 -0.03 -0.18 0.67 1               
  CSR_con -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.11 -0.47 0.30 1             
  Size 0.22 0.22 0.01 -0.39 0.12 0.49 0.41 1           
  ROA 0.02 0.02 -0.14 -0.32 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.22 1         
  B/M 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.16 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.00 -0.09 1       
  Lev 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.05 -0.09 -0.06 0.04 0.16 -0.07 -0.14 1     
  Sgrowth 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.08 0.03 1   
  Age 0.13 0.13 -0.08 -0.31 0.12 0.31 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.00 -0.05 0.09 1 
This table provides Pearson correlations between the key variables for a sample of 10,106 firm-year observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Boldface 
indicates significance at the 1% level. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Table 5b. Sample correlations of key variables in SEM 
  Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk CSR_net CSR_str CSR_con Inside Own B-Index Inv E-Index 
  Risk1 1                   
  Risk2 0.99 1                 
  EDF 0.05 0.05 1               
  Idrisk 0.26 0.26 0.54 1             
  CSR_net 0.13 0.13 -0.04 -0.05 1           
  CSR_str 0.11 0.11 -0.04 -0.16 0.66 1         
  CSR_con -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.13 -0.44 0.35 1       
  Inside Own -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.09 1     
  B-Index -0.36 -0.37 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.12 -0.16 1   
  Inv E-Index 0.15 0.15 -0.08 -0.07 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.13 -0.21 1 
  Size 0.13 0.13 -0.03 -0.28 0.11 0.54 0.50 -0.23 0.03 0.05 
  ROA 0.07 0.07 -0.23 -0.23 0.14 0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.05 
  B/M -0.03 -0.03 0.41 0.39 -0.17 -0.16 0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.14 
  Lev 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.04 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 
  Sgrowth 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
  Age 0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.22 0.06 0.28 0.22 -0.14 -0.05 -0.02 
  Liquidity -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 0.14 -0.02 -0.17 -0.17 0.03 0.06 0.02 
  Tobin's Q 0.13 0.13 -0.17 -0.10 0.24 0.14 -0.12 -0.01 -0.05 0.16 
This table provides Pearson correlations between the key variables for a sample of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 2009. Boldface 
indicates significance at the 1% level. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 5b (continued). Sample correlations of key variables in SEM 
  Size ROA B/M Lev Sgrowth Age Liquidity Tobin's Q 
  Size 1               
  ROA 0.02 1             
  B/M -0.08 -0.40 1           
  Lev 0.15 -0.11 0.01 1         
  Sgrowth 0.00 -0.24 0.15 0.02 1       
  Age 0.34 0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.10 1     
  Liquidity -0.37 -0.11 0.07 -0.11 0.00 -0.15 1   
  Tobin's Q -0.04 0.50 -0.52 -0.21 -0.14 -0.04 0.11 1 
This table provides Pearson correlations between the key variables for a sample of 3,310 firm-year 
observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 2009. Boldface indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
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Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables in this study. For the most part, 
all risk-taking and CSR measures show a high degree of similarity in terms of mean and standard 
deviation across Panels A and B. The smaller sample in Panel B, however, exhibits a smaller range 
with respect to the risk-taking proxies. The Size and Age variables have been replaced with total 
assets and listing age, respectively, since reporting the untransformed values can convey more 
practical information about the sample. Panel C reports the distribution of dichotomous variables. 
Tables 5a and 5b provide sample correlations for the two samples. Risk1 and Risk2 share a 
coefficient of 0.99, a very high degree of correlation. This can be attributed to the method in 
constructing the variables. Risk1 is a measure of the standard deviation of the adjusted earnings 
ratio for the next five years, while Risk2 is a measure of the range over the same time period. Since 
both essentially measure the degree of spread, similarity is to be expected. They are both included 
in the analysis because they are different in their computation and, more importantly, they are both 
found throughout the literature as acceptable measures of managerial risk-taking. 
 
5. Results 
 
In order to gain a thorough understanding on the association between CSR and risk-taking, 
we proceed with a series of tests that involve various proxies, control variables, regression models, 
and the consideration of corporate governance. The aim is to account for a wide range of potential 
sources of error that may confound the relation between our test variables. For instance, despite 
the reputation and praise of the KLD database, there is yet to be an established method of 
constructing the proxy for CSR. Different methods of construction may yield different results, 
potentially leading to flawed inferences. But more importantly, it is vital to consider the strong 
possibility of endogeneity. Measures must be taken to determine its existence in the model, in 
addition to utilizing specific econometric methods should its presence be confirmed. The 
comprehensive nature of the testing process contributes to the reliability of our results and 
inferences. We proceed with a detailed explanation of our testing process. 
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We begin by running a series of multivariate regressions using the standard OLS method 
to determine the empirical relations between CSR and risk-taking. Despite the aforementioned 
issue of endogeneity, we begin with ordinary least squares for comparability with subsequent 
estimation methods. To conduct our analysis, we use a sample of 10,106 firm-year observations 
across 1,959 US public firms from 1995-2009. We control for industry effects by including 
dummies indicating the 2-digit SIC code. 
Careful consideration is taken regarding the type of regressions conducted in the analysis. 
Panel data tend to have certain characteristics that require attention. OLS estimates are unbiased 
when the errors are independently and identically distributed. This assumption, however, is 
typically violated in panel data. Petersen (2008) describes two common types of dependence found 
in panel data. One is time-series dependence, where the residuals of a given firm are correlated 
across multiple years. The other is cross-sectional dependence, where the residuals of a given year 
are correlated across different firms. His paper compares the performance of various methods 
commonly found in the finance literature that are used to address panel data. He finds that clustered 
standard errors, where the regression corrects for the correlation of residuals within firms, provide 
the most accurate estimates. Furthermore, he notes that clustering models are accurate regardless 
of whether firm effects are fixed or temporary, making it superior to other commonly used 
methods. Based on this evidence, we proceed with OLS using robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and year.  
 
5.1. The relation between aggregate CSR measures and risk-taking 
We first employ the aggregate measures of CSR, which combines all dimensions. We 
regress Risk1 on the aggregate net measure as well as the aggregate strengths and concerns 
measures in order to test Hypothesis 1. The econometric models are as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 41 _it it it it itRisk CSR net Size ROA BMα α α α α= + + + + +  
 ( ) ( ) ( )5 6 7it it it itLev Sgrowth Ageα α α ε+ + +     (10) 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 41 _ _it it it it itRisk CSR str CSR con Size ROAα α α α α= + + + + +  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )5 6 7 8it it it it itBM Lev Sgrowth Ageα α α α ε+ + + +   (11) 
 Eq. (10) defines Risk1 as a function of the net aggregate CSR score (CSR_net) as well as 
appropriate firm-level control variables. We focus on the coefficient α1, which represents the 
loading of CSR with respect to risk-taking. If CSR is consistent with shareholder interests and is 
conducive to firm growth and profitability, we would observe a positive loading on the coefficient 
of (CSR_net) in Eq. (10) in support of Hypothesis 1a. However, if CSR engagement arises from 
opportunistic and self-serving motives from managers, we would expect to see a negative loading 
on the coefficient in support of Hypothesis 1b.  
In order to isolate the effect of CSR on the outcome variable, we include six control 
variables that prior literature has determined to significantly influence risk-taking. Specifically, 
they are firm size (Size), return-on-assets (ROA), book-to-market ratio (BM), leverage (Lev), sales 
growth (Sgrowth), and firm age (Age). Justifications for each control variable are provided in 
subsection 4.4.  
Eq. (11) uses the aggregate CSR scores separated by strengths and concerns, which 
provides a more detailed examination of the effects of socially responsible vs. irresponsible 
actions. The loading results from this model can be particularly illumination regarding the nature 
of CSR measurement. Ideally, a positive association between CSR and risk-taking would 
decompose neatly into a positive coefficient for aggregate strengths (CSR_str) and a negative 
coefficient for aggregate concerns (CSR_con) of approximately equal magnitudes. However, 
several prior studies suggest that this may not necessarily be the case. Numerous empirical papers 
support the notion that socially responsible and irresponsible actions are perceived differently by 
investors and managers, and consequently have different impacts on certain firm characteristics 
(Strike et al., 2006; Oikonomou et al., 2012; Bouslah et al., 2013). If these explanations are valid, 
they should be reflected in the estimates of Model (5) such that the coefficients of strengths and 
concerns are not equal opposites of each other.  
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Table 6a. OLS: Risk1 on aggregate CSR scores 
  Risk1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  CSR_net             0.036***   
              (0.012)   
  CSR_str               0.83* 
                (0.45) 
  CSR_con             -2.24*** 
                (0.86) 
  Size 0.12**           0.11*** 0.13*** 
  (0.045)           (0.039) (0.052) 
  ROA   0.098         -0.13 -0.17 
    (0.30)         (0.23) (0.23) 
  B/M     0.019       0.029 0.023 
      (0.055)       (0.055) (0.052) 
  Lev       0.095     0.021 -0.020 
        (0.071)     (0.071) (0.073) 
  Sgrowth         0.21**   0.19* 0.19* 
          (0.10)   (0.10) (0.10) 
  Age           0.096** 0.017 0.018 
            (0.044) (0.027) (0.026) 
  Constant -0.37 0.65*** 0.65** 0.64*** 0.47** 0.28 -0.48* -0.44 
  (0.27) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) (0.19) (-0.48) (0.29) 
  n 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 
  Adj R^2 0.056 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.017 0.024 0.071 0.087 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking. Risk1, the 
volatility of corporate profits, is regressed on aggregate CSR scores (CSR_net, CSR_str, and CSR_con) as well as 
control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 10,106 
firm-year observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results are omitted. 
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Table 6a reports regressions results of Risk1 on the aggregate measures of CSR. Models 1 
through 6 regress Risk1 individually on each control variable, while Models 7 and 8 run full model 
tests, first using the net aggregate CSR score (CSR_net), then again using aggregate strengths and 
concerns (CSR_str and CSR_con). 
We first assess the effect of CSR on Risk1 by examining Models 7 and 8 in Table 6a. Model 
7 indicates that CSR ratings share a positive and significant association with the volatility of 
corporate profits after controlling for appropriate firm characteristics. Model 8 reports a significant 
and positive (negative) loading on CSR strengths (concerns).  
Economically speaking, Model 7 indicates that every 1 point increase in the net CSR score 
is accompanied by an increase of 0.036 in the standard deviation of the firm’s earnings ratio in the 
following years. Model 8 requires an altered interpretation due to the different computation method 
of aggregate strengths and concerns. Recall that both scores (CSR_str and CSR_con) are 
proportional values that indicate how many criteria are fulfilled compared to the total number 
possible. In this context, Model 8 of Table 6a indicates that a 10% increase of CSR strength criteria 
fulfillment is accompanied by an increase of 0.083 in the standard deviation of the firm’s earnings 
ratio in the following years. Likewise, a 10% increase of the CSR concern criteria fulfillment is 
accompanied by a decrease of 0.224 in the standard deviation of the same standard deviation. The 
results indicate that the presence of CSR concerns decrease risk-taking much more so than CSR 
strengths increase it. This finding provides moderate support of the view that CSR strengths and 
concerns do not measure the opposite sides of the same scale, but are instead empirically and 
conceptually distinct constructs.  
The results overall support Hypothesis 1a, which predicts that CSR performance is 
positively related to managerial risk-taking. Tests using lagged values of CSR scores yield the 
same outcome. Because higher risk-tolerance is necessary for firm growth and profitability, these 
results support the view that CSR investments are conducive to firm value-maximizing behavior 
and thus consistent with shareholder interests. The decomposed estimates (Model 8 of Table 6a) 
are not only consistent with prior results but also provide a logical and interpretable understanding 
of CSR’s association with risk-taking. While socially responsible actions come with increased 
risk-taking, the opposite is also observed. Poor CSR performance has a distinctly opposite effect 
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on risk-taking. Empirical evidence by Goss and Roberts (2011) provide one possible explanation 
for this negative relationship. They find that firms with poor records in the “concerns” category 
face significantly higher costs of bank loans, suggesting that the banks view such firms as poor 
quality borrowers. Under these circumstances, banks have incentives to monitor the firm’s 
operations to ensure against default. A common monitoring method is to limit risk-taking (John et 
al., 2008).  
 Though we find evidence that CSR increases with risk-taking, CSR has also been found to 
lead to a reduced cost of equity (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). The results suggest that both CSR and the 
riskier corporate operations are viewed from the sustainability and profitability perspective, 
supported by evidence that higher risk-taking leads to firm growth (John et al., 2008). In this 
context, though CSR is associated with more risk-taking, it can still result in a decreased cost of 
equity capital by serving as an indication of sustainability and profitability. Furthermore, both a 
reduced cost of equity capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011) and higher risk-taking (John et al., 2008) is 
associated with enhanced firm value. Thus CSR’s relation to both the cost of equity and risk-taking 
can help explain the findings by Jiao (2010), who empirically confirms that CSR increases with 
firm value.  
 
Sensitivity Tests: Aggregate CSR measures with alternative risk-taking proxies 
For robustness, we repeat the process using alternate proxies of risk-taking. Specifically, 
we use Risk2 (the earnings gap), the EDF (expected default frequency), and idiosyncratic risk. We 
continue to find support for Hypothesis 1a. Results are reported in Tables 6b, 6c, and 6d. 
Tables 6b, 6c, and 6d show full to partial support for those using Risk1. Table 6b employing 
Risk2 shows high consistency as expected, given the strong correlation between the two proxies. 
The net aggregate CSR score as well as the CSR strength score show positive and significant 
coefficients, while the CSR concern score shows a negative and significant one. Results from the 
two market-based measures are consistent with each other but differ slightly from those of the 
accounting-based measures.  
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Table 6b. OLS: Risk2 on aggregate CSR scores 
  Risk2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  CSR_net             0.087***   
              (0.030)   
  CSR_str               2.02* 
                (1.07) 
  CSR_con             -5.32*** 
                (2.02) 
  Size 0.28**           0.25*** 0.32** 
  (0.11)           (0.093) (0.12) 
  ROA   0.20         -0.35 -0.44 
    (0.72)         (0.057) (0.56) 
  B/M     0.044       0.068 0.053 
      (0.13)       (0.13) (0.12) 
  Lev       0.23     0.048 -0.048 
        (0.17)     (0.17) (0.17) 
  Sgrowth         0.50**   0.44* 0.45* 
          (-0.49)   (0.24) (0.24) 
  Age           0.23** 0.042 0.046 
            (0.11) (0.065) (0.062) 
  Constant -0.85 1.57*** 1.57** 0.012*** 1.13** 0.68 -1.11* -1.02 
  (0.64) (0.58) (0.63) (0.59) (0.55) (0.46) (0.64) (0.69) 
  n 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 
  Adj R^2 0.056 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.024 0.072 0.087 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking. Risk2, the 
earnings gap, is regressed on aggregate CSR scores (CSR_net, CSR_str, and CSR_con) as well as control variables. 
Standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 10,106 firm-year 
observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable 
definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results are omitted. 
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Table 6c. OLS: EDF on aggregate CSR scores 
  EDF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
CSR_net             0.0006   
              (0.0006)   
  
CSR_str               0.059** 
                (0.027) 
  CSR_con             0.032 
                (0.034) 
  Size -0.0006           0.0002 -0.0013 
  (0.0011
) 
          (0.0009) (0.0012) 
  ROA   -0.079***         -0.044*** -0.043*** 
    (0.015)         (0.010) (0.011) 
  B/M     
0.034**
*       0.038*** 0.039*** 
      (0.0063)       (0.0046) (0.0046) 
  Lev       0.12***     0.13*** 0.13*** 
        (0.037)     (0.038) (0.039) 
  Sgrowth         
0.038**
*   0.028*** 0.028*** 
          (0.0099)   (0.0082) (0.0081) 
  Age           -0.006** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
            (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0020) 
  Constant 0.020 0.022*** -0.0009 -0.0070 -0.02*** 0.039** -0.028*** -0.028** 
  (0.015) (0.0061) (0.0083) (0.0080
) 
(0.0067) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
  n 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 
  Adj R^2 0.036 0.056 0.067 0.089 0.052 0.040 0.15 0.15 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking. The EDF, the 
expected default frequency, is regressed on aggregate CSR scores (CSR_net, CSR_str, and CSR_con) as well as 
control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 10,106 
firm-year observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results are omitted. 
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Table 6d. OLS: Idiosyncratic risk on aggregate CSR scores 
  Idrisk (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  CSR_net             0.0001   
              (0.0001)   
  CSR_str               0.016*** 
                (0.0031) 
  CSR_con             0.0069 
                (0.0079) 
  Size -0.003***           -0.002*** -0.003*** 
  (0.0004)           (0.0004) (0.0005) 
  ROA   -0.023***         -0.014*** -0.014*** 
    (0.0029)         (0.0027) (0.0028) 
  B/M     0.004***       0.0038*** 0.0039*** 
      (0.0013)       (0.0014) (0.0014) 
  Lev       0.005*     0.0078** 0.0084** 
        (0.0027)     (0.0034) (0.0036) 
  Sgrowth         0.002***   0.0006 0.0005 
          (0.0006)   (0.0005) (0.0005) 
  Age           -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
            (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
  Constant 0.043*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0036) 
  n 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 
  Adj R^2 0.19 0.14 0.072 0.051 0.047 0.13 0.052 0.29 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The purpose of 
the tests is to investigate the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking. Idiosyncratic risk is regressed on 
aggregate CSR scores (CSR_net, CSR_str, and CSR_con) as well as control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets 
below the coefficients. The sample consists of 10,106 firm-year observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results are omitted. 
 
Model 8 in Tables 6c and 6d indicate that CSR strengths share a positive and significant 
association with the market-based proxies of risk-taking. However, Model 7 in both tables show 
that the net aggregate CSR score (CSR_net) shares no significant association with these proxies. 
The aggregate concern score also shows no relation for both market-based measures.  
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Tables 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d overall support the hypothesis that CSR performance is positively 
associated with risk-taking. Tests using the accounting-based proxies show that the converse is 
true, where socially irresponsible actions are inversely related to risk-taking. However, tests using 
market-based proxies show no evidence of this inverse relationship.  
CSR strengths display a positive effect on the EDF and idiosyncratic risk, even though the 
net CSR score shows no significance. This discrepancy may be explained by concerns raised by 
Bouslah et al. (2013) and Galema et al. (2008) that combining CSR strengths and weakness may 
result in a loss of information. It is possible that the net measure may have cancelled or offset 
certain movements in the data, and only by separating strengths and concerns can the underlying 
associations be revealed. 
5.2. The relation between individual CSR dimensions and risk-taking 
 Because CSR is a broad term that includes activities in several distinct areas, we next 
investigate the associations between risk-taking and the individual dimensions of CSR. Doing so 
can elucidate which dimensions are significant and which are irrelevant to risk-taking. The tests 
are conducted via the following econometric models: 
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Eq. (12) describes Risk1 as a function of the net scores of each dimension in addition to the 
same set of firm-level control variables. Specifically the explanatory variables include the net 
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scores (computed as the total number of indicated strengths minus that of concerns) of the 
community (COM_net), diversity (DIV_net), employee relations (EMP_net), environment 
(ENV_net), human rights (HUM_net), and product characteristics (PRO_net) dimensions. The 
same control variables are included from earlier regressions as we are using the same outcome 
variables.  
 Eq. (13) take the decomposition a step further by separating each dimension into its 
respective strengths and concerns. Each strength (concern) score is computed by taking the number 
of indicated strengths (concerns) and dividing it by the total possible number of strengths 
(concerns), yielding a proportional value. Strength scores are denoted with the suffix “_str” 
following the CSR dimension name, while concern scores contain the suffix “_con”.  
 Table 7a reports the estimates of regressing the various risk-taking proxies on the net scores 
of individual CSR dimensions. Models 1 through 4 regress each proxy on the dimensional net 
scores alone, while Models 5 through 8 regress each proxy on the full model by including control 
variables.  
We focus on Models 5 through 8 in Table 7a to see the effects of the dimensional net scores 
on the various risk-taking proxies. Model 5 shows that Risk1 shares a negative relation with the 
net diversity score, while it shares positive relations with the employee relations and product 
characteristics net scores. Model 6 using Risk2 reports the same results, the only difference being 
its insignificant relation to the diversity net score. In contrast, the two market-based proxies in 
Models 7 and 8 show positive and significant associations with the diversity net score. 
Furthermore, they lack any significant associations with the employee relations or product 
characteristics dimensions. 
The results support the conjecture that investments in only certain categories of CSR affect 
risk-taking, however exactly which dimensions are significant apparently depend on which risk-
taking proxy we are examining. The accounting-based proxies show sensitivity to ratings in the 
employee relations and product characteristics dimensions, whereas the market-based proxies 
show sensitivity to the diversity dimension.   
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Table 7a. OLS: Risk-taking on CSR net scores by dimension 
  Dependent variable 
  Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Com_net 0.050 0.12 -0.0033 -0.001*** 0.027 0.068 0.0009 -0.0002 
  (0.050) (0.12) (0.0022) (0.0005) (0.046) (0.11) (0.0015) (0.0003) 
  Div_net 0.033** 0.078** -0.0002 -0.001*** -0.023* -0.053 0.0022*** 0.0003** 
  (0.015) (0.036) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.014) (0.033) (0.001) (0.0001) 
  Emp_net 0.16*** 0.38*** -0.0039 -0.0003 0.15*** 0.36*** -0.0007 0.0004 
  (0.056) (0.13) (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.049) (0.12) (0.0019) (0.0004) 
  Env_net -0.067** -0.16** 0.0003 0.001** -0.039 -0.094 0.0003 -0.0001 
  (0.030) (0.074) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.026) (0.062) (0.0015) (0.0002) 
  Hum_net 0.010 0.027 0.0064 0.0016** 0.091 0.22 0.0023 -0.0006 
  (0.056) (0.13) (0.0057) (0.0008) (0.057) (0.13) (0.0040) (0.0006) 
  Pro_net 0.0050 0.014 -0.0010 0.0014*** 0.071** 0.17** -0.0016 -0.0002 
  (0.023) (0.054) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.031) (0.075) (0.0020) (0.0003) 
  Size         0.12*** 0.29*** -0.0006 -0.002*** 
          (0.042) (0.10) (0.0009) (0.0004) 
  ROA         -0.18 -0.47 -0.044*** -0.014*** 
          (0.21) (0.50) (0.010) (0.0028) 
  B/M         0.022 0.050 0.039*** 0.0039*** 
          (0.051) (0.12) (0.0045) (0.0014) 
  Lev         0.018 0.041 0.13*** 0.0080** 
          (0.074) (0.17) (0.038) (0.0034) 
  Sgrowth         0.20** 0.47** 0.028*** 0.0006 
          (0.10) (0.24) (0.0080) (0.0005) 
  Age         0.019 0.048 -0.005*** -0.002*** 
          (0.027) (0.066) (0.0019) (0.0003) 
  Constant 0.49 1.18 0.019 0.022*** -0.60** -1.40* -0.026** 0.042*** 
  NA NA (0.012) (0.0026) (0.30) (0.72) (0.010) (0.0036) 
  n 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 
  Adj R^2 0.055 0.056 0.038 0.089 0.098 0.099 0.15 0.29 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The purpose of 
the tests is to investigate the association between disaggregate CSR scores and risk-taking. The various risk-taking proxies are 
regressed on the separate CSR dimensions as well as control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the 
coefficients. The sample consists of 10,106 firm-year observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results are omitted. 
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We proceed to further analysis by separating the individual CSR dimensions into their 
respective strengths and concerns. Table 7b reports the estimates with respect to each risk-taking 
proxy. Similar to Table 7a, Models 1 through 4 use only the CSR scores as explanatory variables 
whereas Models 5 through 8 run full models that include all control variables.  
 
Table 7b. OLS: Risk-taking on CSR strengths & concerns by dimension 
 Dependent Variable 
 Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Com_str 0.67* 1.61* -0.029 -0.009** 0.47 1.15 0.0048 0.0006 
  (0.40) (0.97) (0.018) (0.0036) (0.37) (0.89) (0.012) (0.0023) 
  Com_con 0.18 0.41 -0.0021 0.0019 0.075 0.16 -0.0006 0.004* 
  (0.24) (0.56) (0.015) (0.0031) (0.23) (0.55) (0.013) (0.0024) 
  Div_str -0.26 -0.60 0.0082 -0.005** -0.50** -1.19** 0.021* 0.0026 
  (0.17) (0.42) (0.011) (0.0022) (0.22) (0.52) (0.011) (0.0018) 
  Div_con -0.47* -1.10* 0.013 0.0063*** -0.33* -0.77*** 0.0053 0.0013 
  (0.25) (0.58) (0.012) (0.0023) (0.20) (0.47) (0.0082) (0.0015) 
  Emp_str 0.93*** 2.21*** 0.0009 0.0026 0.79*** 1.88*** 0.016* 0.008*** 
  (0.24) (0.59) (0.0096) (0.0021) (0.21) (0.50) (0.0092) (0.0016) 
  Emp_con -0.85** -2.02** 0.034 0.0017 -0.97*** -2.31** 0.018 0.0014 
  (0.35) (0.83) (0.022) (0.0031) (0.37) (0.87) (0.018) (0.0034) 
  Env_str -0.39* -0.94* -0.0002 -0.006*** -0.53** -1.26** 0.0036 -0.0024 
  (0.22) (0.53) (0.0076) (0.0023) (0.25) (0.59) (0.0073) (0.0023) 
  Env_con 0.22 0.54 -0.0031 -0.009*** -0.086 -0.19 -0.0040 -0.0009 
  (0.23) (0.56) (0.016) (0.0019) (0.23) (0.55) (0.016) (0.0020) 
  Hum_str -0.37 -0.87 -0.0066 0.0009 -0.37 -0.86 -0.0087 0.0006 
  (0.29) (0.70) (0.0055) (0.0018) (0.28) (0.67) (0.0079) (0.0012) 
  
Hum_con -0.33 -0.80 -0.029 -0.0046 -0.52** -1.24** -0.016 0.0007 
  (0.23) (0.53) (0.023) (0.0033) (0.24) (0.57) (0.018) (0.0029) 
  Pro_str 0.80*** 1.92*** -0.027 -0.0047 0.70*** 1.67*** -0.0019 0.0017 
  (0.29) (0.71) (0.020) (0.0035) (0.25) (0.60) (0.017) (0.0026) 
  Pro_con 0.28** 0.65** -0.0026 -0.007*** -0.039 -0.10 0.0074 0.0013 
  (0.12) (0.29) (0.0074) (0.0016) (0.085) (0.20) (0.0065) (0.0010) 
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  Size         0.13*** 0.31*** -0.0013 -0.003*** 
          (0.048) (0.11) (0.0011) (0.0005) 
  ROA         -0.23 -0.59 -0.042*** -0.014*** 
          (0.19) (0.47) (0.011) (0.0029) 
  B/M         0.028 0.064 0.039*** 0.004*** 
          (0.051) (0.12) (0.0045) (0.0014) 
  Lev         0.018 0.043 0.13*** 0.008** 
          (0.073) (0.17) (0.038) (0.0034) 
  Sgrowth         0.20** 0.46** 0.028*** 0.0005 
          (0.10) (0.23) (0.0080) (0.0005) 
  Age         0.015 0.037 -0.005*** -0.002*** 
          (0.026) (0.062) (0.0018) (0.0003) 
  constant 0.51*** 1.23*** 0.018 0.024*** -0.51* -1.19* -0.026** 0.042*** 
  (0.097) (0.23) (0.014) (0.0028) (0.29) (0.69) (0.011) (0.0036) 
  n 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 10106 
  Adj R^2 0.082 0.082 0.040 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.30 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate the association between disaggregate CSR scores and risk-taking. The various 
risk-taking proxies are regressed on the strengths and concerns of separate CSR dimensions as well as control 
variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 10,106 firm-year 
observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable 
definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results are omitted. 
 
In Table 7b, we focus on Models 5 through 8 to see how the individual dimensions’ 
strengths and concerns affect the various measures of risk-taking. Most notably, we find significant 
associations within the strengths or concerns of certain dimensions that exhibited no significance 
when examining their net scores. For instance, Table 7a reports that the net scores of the 
environment (Env_net) and human rights (Hum_net) dimensions are not significantly related to 
risk-taking. However, Table 7b shows a negative and significant association between risk-taking 
(specifically Risk1 and Risk2) and both environment strengths (Env_str) and human rights 
concerns (Hum_con). This provides further support for the notion that the decomposition of CSR 
scores can reveal significant relationships that would otherwise remain unknown.  
The employee relations dimension shows the most robust results among the CSR measures. 
Models 5 and 6 in Table 7a show that its net score (Emp_net) is positively and significantly 
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associated with Risk1 and Risk2, while sharing no significant association with the other two 
market-based measures. However, after decomposition, Table 7b shows that employee relations 
strengths (Emp_str) show robust positive significance across all risk-taking proxies. This suggests 
that a firm that invests more in their employees’ interest and wellbeing engage in a higher degree 
of risk-taking. This finding contradicts those of Verwijemeren and Derwall (2010), who find 
evidence in support of the opposite relationship. They suggest that firms that care more about 
employee welfare take lower risks, measured via firm leverage, in order to reduce the probability 
of bankruptcy. This disparity in findings may be partially explained by the use of different risk-
taking proxies.  
Between Tables 7a and 7b, only the employee relations dimension show robust consistency 
among the risk-taking proxies. For the accounting based measures, Risk1 and Risk2, environment 
strengths (product characteristics strengths) share a negative (positive) association with risk-
taking. The market-based measures show no such significance. Taken together, the results refute 
Hypothesis 2. Performance in the employee relations dimension was predicted to share an inverse 
relation with risk-taking, but a positive relation is observed. Additionally, performance in the 
environment dimension was predicted to share a positive relation with risk-taking, but the opposite 
is observed with respect to Risk1 and Risk2, while sharing no significant association with the 
market-based measures. 
Other dimensions and their respective strengths and concerns show significance but they 
are hardly robust across the testing methods. The results from this particular context suggest that 
each risk-taking proxy captures a different aspect of the manager’s risk preferences. While the use 
of aggregate CSR scores support a consistent conclusion, discrepancies manifest after 
decomposition.  
 
5.3. The effect of high governance quality on aggregate CSR measures and risk-
taking 
We next investigate the effect of high governance quality on the association between CSR 
and risk-taking. Results can provide insight on whether firms bearing strong governance 
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characteristics have a distinctly different CSR-risk-taking association relative to lower governance 
quality firms.  
We accomplish this through the use of econometric methods involving dummy variables 
and interaction terms. To elaborate, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm 
exhibits strong governance quality. We also include the interaction term that multiplies this 
dummy variable with the appropriate CSR score. The corresponding regression estimate of this 
interaction term provides evidence specifically on how the presence of strong governance quality 
impacts the main test relationship. The econometric models are presented as follows: 
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 Eq. (14) defines Risk1 as a function of the net aggregate CSR score (CSR_net), dummy 
variables indicating strong internal and external governance (B_dum and InvE_dum, respectively), 
interaction terms that combine the CSR score with the dummy variables, and firm-specific 
controls. B_dum (InvE_dum) takes on a value of one if the corresponding B-Index (Inverted E-
Index) is greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Eq. (15) defines a similar model 
where the CSR score is divided into its respective strengths and concerns. Additional interaction 
terms are included to accommodate this division.   
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Table 8a. OLS: Risk-taking on CSR involving governance interaction terms 
  Dependent variable 
  Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CSR_net 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.001 0.0002 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.001) (0.0002) 
  B_dum -0.44** -1.06** 0.002 -0.0005 
  (0.22) (0.52) (0.003) (0.0014) 
  InvE_dum 0.14 0.34 -0.001 -0.0004 
  (0.21) (0.49) (0.006) (0.0018) 
  (CSR_net)*(B_dum) -0.05*** -0.11*** 0.001 -0.0001 
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.002) (0.0002) 
  (CSR_net)*(InvE_dum) -0.01 -0.03 0.001 0.0002 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.001) (0.0002) 
  Size 0.07** 0.18** 0.001 -0.0014*** 
  (0.03) (0.08) (0.002) (0.0005) 
  ROA 0.95 2.2 -0.046 -0.011** 
  (0.61) (1.47) (0.036) (0.0051) 
  B/M 0.03 0.07 0.061*** 0.007*** 
  (0.13) (0.31) (0.007) (0.0012) 
  Lev 0.36** 0.86** 0.101** 0.006*** 
  (0.18) (0.44) (0.041) (0.0019) 
  Sgrowth 0.55** 1.31** 0.077*** 0.0027 
  (0.25) (0.58) (0.024) (0.0017) 
  Age -0.02 -0.05 -0.002 -0.0015*** 
  (0.04) (0.1) (0.001) (0.0004) 
  Constant -0.41 -0.95 -0.11*** 0.027*** 
  (0.28) (0.65) (0.023) (0.0033) 
  n 3,804 3,804 3,804 3,804 
  Adj R^2 0.13 0.13 0.29 0.28 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate whether and how high governance quality affects the association between 
aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking. All risk-taking proxies are regressed on the interactions of aggregate CSR 
scores with dummies indicating high governance quality in addition to control variables. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 3,804 firm-year observations across 1,002 firms 
from 1998 to 2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources 
are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Industry dummy results are omitted. 
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We focus on the coefficients of the interaction terms (α4 and α5 of Eq. (14), and α5 through 
α8 of Eq. (15)) to ascertain how the presence of strong internal or external governance influences 
the effect of CSR on risk-taking. Results for Eq. (15) across all risk-taking proxies are reported in 
Table 8a. 
In Table 8a, significance is observed only from the term (CSR_net)*(B_dum) on the two 
accounting-based risk-taking proxies, Risk1 and Risk2. The negative sign indicates that the 
magnitude of the effect of CSR on risk-taking decreases in the presence of strong B-Index ratings. 
With respect to the estimate of the CSR score, only models involving Risk1 and Risk2 show 
significance, consistent with previous tests. External governance quality, as denoted by Inv_Edum, 
is shown to have no influence on the effect of CSR on risk-taking.  
The results from Models 1 and 2 from Table 8a suggests that firms with highly independent 
boards and committees display a weaker, but still positive, association between CSR and risk-
taking. A stronger association is observed from firms with moderate to poor internal governance. 
We repeat the test using CSR scores separated into strengths and concerns. 
 Table 8b presents the results of Eq. (18) across all risk-taking proxies. Estimates of the 
interactions between governance quality and CSR strengths/concerns are reported across all risk-
taking proxies.  
The coefficients of the interaction terms in Table 8b hardly show uniformity across the 
different risk-taking proxies. Models 1 and 2 report negative coefficients for the term 
(CSR_str)*(B_dum), indicating that the effect of CSR strengths on risk-taking decreases in the 
presence of strong internal governance. In addition, the negative coefficients of the interaction 
terms are greater in magnitude than those of the positive coefficients of the CSR strength score 
alone. Taken together, CSR strengths actually have an inverse relationship with risk-taking in the 
context of strong internal governance. The same models report positive coefficients for the term 
(CSR_con)*(B_dum), indicating that the presence of strong internal governance dampens the 
negative association between CSR concerns and risk-taking. External governance quality, as 
denoted by Inv_Edum, is shown to have no effect on CSR strengths or concerns relative to Risk1 
and Risk2.  
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Table 8b. OLS: Risk-taking on CSR strengths and concerns involving governance interaction terms 
  Dependent variable 
  Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CSR_str 1.59** 3.78** 0.11*** 0.016*** 
  (0.78) (1.84) (0.03) (0.005) 
  CSR_con -3.21*** -7.69*** 0.048 0.0002 
  (1.1) (2.6) (0.039) (0.01) 
  B_dum -0.44** -1.03** 0.005 -0.0002 
  (0.21) (0.5) NA (0.001) 
  InvE_dum 0.17 0.40 0.002 0.000 
  (0.17) (0.41) (0.005) (0.002) 
  (CSR_str)*(B_dum) -1.96*** -4.69*** -0.013 -0.007 
  (0.64) (1.53) (0.067) (0.006) 
  (CSR_str)*(InvE_dum) -0.37 -0.9 0.006 0.007 
  (0.78) (1.85) (0.021) (0.007) 
  (CSR_con)*(B_dum) 1.63*** 3.84*** -0.039* 0.0005 
  (0.32) (0.77) (0.022) (0.004) 
  (CSR_con)*(InvE_dum) -0.1 -0.18 -0.035* -0.0105* 
  (0.69) (1.63) (0.021) (0.006) 
  Size 0.13** 0.31** -0.002 -0.0016** 
  (0.05) (0.12) (0.002) (0.001) 
  ROA 0.91 2.11 -0.047 -0.011** 
  (0.58) (1.4) (0.036) (0.005) 
  B/M 0.03 0.06 0.061*** 0.007*** 
  (0.13) (0.31) (0.007) (0.001) 
  Lev 0.29 0.69 0.104** 0.007*** 
  (0.18) (0.43) (0.043) (0.002) 
  Sgrowth 0.58** 1.38** 0.076*** 0.0025 
  (0.25) (0.59) (0.023) (0.002) 
  Age -0.01 -0.02 -0.003* -0.002*** 
  (0.04) (0.1) (0.001) (0.0003) 
  Constant -0.5 -1.17 -0.104*** 0.0275*** 
  (0.35) (0.83) (0.021) (0.003) 
  n 3,804 3,804 3,804 3,804 
  Adj R^2 0.16 0.16 0.29 0.28 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate whether high governance quality affects the association between aggregate CSR 
scores and risk-taking. All risk-taking proxies are regressed on the interactions of CSR strengths/concerns with dummies 
indicating high governance quality in addition to control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the 
coefficients. The sample consists of 3,804 firm-year observations across 1,002 firms from 1998 to 2009. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results are omitted. 
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Tests using the market-based proxies show dissimilar results, as reported in Models 3 and 
4 of Table 8b. In these cases, only CSR concerns are affected by the presence of strong governance. 
The estimates of (CSR_con)*(InvE_dum) are negative and significant for both the EDF and 
idiosyncratic risk, while the estimates of (CSR_con)*(B_dum) are negative and significant for the 
EDF only. Since the estimate for CSR concerns alone are statistically no different from zero, the 
presence of strong governance results in an inverse association between CSR concerns and the 
market-based risk measures. Therefore, in the context of strong governance, CSR strengths 
(concerns) share a positive (negative) association with the market-based risk-taking proxies, which 
is consistent with the results of previous analyses involving the accounting-based measures.  
Overall, the results from Tables 8a and 8b are inconsistent and at times contradictory. The 
presence of strong internal or external governance has non-uniform impacts on the effect of CSR, 
depending on which proxy for risk-taking is used. Furthermore, the signs of the coefficients of the 
interaction terms were unexpected. Results generally contradicted or provided weak evidence for 
Hypothesis 3, which postulates a particularly strong and positive association between CSR and 
risk-taking in the context of strong governance.  
However, as previously mentioned, it is important to account for the possibility of 
endogeneity before drawing conclusions. Hence, we proceed to further testing by correcting for 
endogeneity in the model. We discuss the process in detail in the following subsection. 
 
5.4. The relation between aggregate CSR measures and risk-taking while 
accounting for governance quality 
This subsection outlines the empirical investigation of the association between CSR and 
risk-taking while including governance measures. These governance measures are anticipated to 
introduce endogeneity into the model, which requires special consideration. We address this issue 
by way of SEM. 
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5.4.1. Simultaneous equation modeling (SEM) 
 
SEM provides new evidence towards our analysis primarily due to fundamental differences 
in testing procedures and methodology. The previous tests involving governance interaction terms 
classify the firms with simple and discrete labels of strong or poor governance. The aim of the 
tests was to determine how the presence of distinctly strong governance impacted the effect of 
CSR on risk-taking. SEM, on the other hand, accounts for how differences and co-movements of 
governance quality affect the main test relationship. Therefore, this test does not observe how only 
strong governance impacts the main variables. Instead, it can observe how governance quality in 
general, ranging from poor to high in addition to all values in between, can mediate or moderate 
the association between CSR and risk-taking and thus provide a more comprehensive analysis. 
Before taking the previous test results at face value, we first account for the possibility of 
endogeneity within our models. Recall that the use of the OLS method in the presence of 
endogeneity leads to biased or inconsistent results. Consequently, Larcker et al. (2010) stress the 
necessity to describe the nature of the endogeneity problem within the research question and to 
evaluate alternative empirical approaches. Using appropriate econometric methods to correct for 
these issues may provide more thorough and comprehensive evidence regarding the nature of the 
relationship between CSR and risk-taking. Thus we review the theoretical and empirical relations 
between CSR, corporate governance, and risk-taking to identify potential sources of endogeneity.  
As previously discussed, the omitted variable problem is one source of endogeneity. This 
arises when there exists a common variable that significantly influences both explanatory and 
outcome variables, however is not included in the model. The inclusion of corporate governance 
mitigates this problem. Governance characteristics have been found to significantly impact CSR 
engagement (Brown et al., 2006; Jo et al., 2012) as well as risk-taking (La Porta et al., 2000; John 
et al., 2008).  
Insider ownership is another variable that has significant associations with the test 
variables. Changes in ownership structure can considerably alter the motives and consequences of 
certain managerial decisions, including CSR (Barnea et al., 2010) and risk-taking (Byrd et al., 
1998). Conversely, risk-taking may also affect insider ownership. Cho (1998) explains how risk 
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aversion may curb the manager’s ability or willingness to hold a large proportion of their 
company’s shares. Jiao (2010) discusses how both insider ownership and governance strength may 
influence the degree of alignment between managerial incentives and shareholder interests in 
addition to stakeholders’ bargaining power, which may affect CSR engagement. She further 
describes how numerous prior studies have been plagued by endogeneity issues from their 
treatment of CSR as an exogenous factor. By incorporating proxies for governance quality and 
insider ownership into our model, we enhance the validity of our inferences. The following figure 
depicts a path diagram that indicates directions of causation between variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Path diagram 
Figure 1 represents relationships between main variables as well as their direct and indirect effects on risk-taking. 
Associations are based on prior theoretical and empirical evidence. 
 
 We use the above diagram in addition to extant literature to develop a system of equations. 
This system can correct for endogeneity and offer a more detailed thorough investigation into the 
association between CSR and risk-taking. The system of equations is presented as follows: 
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Size ROA BM Lev Sgrowth Age
α α α α α
α α α α α α ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
 (16) 
Risk-taking 
Governance 
Quality 
Insider 
Ownership 
CSR 
e1 e2 
e3 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
_ _it it it it it
it it it
CSR net InsOwn Bindex inv Eindex Size
BM Lev
α α α α α
α α ξ
= + + + + +
+ +
  (17) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
1 _it it it it it
it it
InsOwn Risk Bindex inv Eindex Size
Lev Liq Tobin
α α α α α
α α α ν
= + + + + +
+ + +
  (18) 
 
 Eq. (16) defines Risk1 as a function of the net aggregate CSR score (CSR_net), the fraction 
of insider ownership (InsOwn), the B-index (Bindex), the inverted E-index (Inv_Eindex), firm size 
(Size), return-on-assets (ROA), the book-to-market ratio (BM), firm leverage (Lev), sales growth 
(Sgrowth), and firm age (Age). 
 Eq. (17) defines the net aggregate CSR score as a function of the fraction of insider 
ownership, the B-index, the inverted E-index, firm size, the book-to-market ratio, and firm 
leverage. 
 Eq. (18) defines the fraction of insider ownership as a function of risk-taking, the B-index, 
the inverted E-index, firm size, firm leverage, liquidity (Liq), and Tobin’s Q (Tobin).   
The next step is to ensure that the model is properly identified. We proceed by confirming 
whether the model fulfills order conditions of identification. “In order for an equation to be 
identified, the number of predetermined variables excluded from the equation must not be less than 
the number of endogenous variables included in that equation less 1” (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
We count the number of endogenous and predetermined variables within the model as well as 
within each equation and confirm that each equation within the system is indeed over-identified. 
This indicates that the use of OLS is inappropriate, and that the simultaneous equations approach 
should be used instead.  
There still exist possibilities of reverse-causality problems or simultaneity bias. In order to 
detect the presence of reciprocal feedback between risk-taking and insider ownership, as theorized 
in the path diagram, we conduct the Hausman specification test. This test essentially checks 
whether an endogenous regressor is correlated with the error term. We first regress Eq. (16), the 
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equation defining risk-taking, using OLS and compute the residuals, “e”. We then regress model 
(18), the equation defining insider ownership, while including “e” from the previous regression. 
The F-test on the coefficient of “e” exhibits significance, indicating that there is indeed a 
correlation and that simultaneity is present in the model. We thus proceed to apply simultaneous 
equation modeling (SEM) in order to empirically disentangle the effect of governance and insider 
ownership on CSR to obtain accurate estimates. We use a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
approach to investigate the joint effects of CSR, corporate governance, and insider ownership on 
risk-taking.  
 
5.4.2. Evidence on the relation between CSR and risk-taking while accounting for governance 
quality 
 
 We begin with the simultaneous estimation of the system of equations using three-stage 
least squares (3SLS). The first test investigates the association between the risk-taking proxy 
Risk1, the volatility of corporate profits, and the net aggregate CSR score (CSR_net) while taking 
into account governance quality. Table 9a reports the estimates of the simultaneous equations 
regression. Models 1 through 3 represent each equation within the system. 
Consistent with earlier tests, we observe a positive and significant loading on the CSR 
score in Model 1 of Table 9a. The governance indices have significant effects on the net CSR score 
as well as on insider ownership. Both variables share a negative relation with the B-Index and a 
positive one with the inverted E-Index. Neither index, however, shows a significant relation with 
risk-taking.  
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Table 9a. SEM (3SLS): Risk1, CSR_net, and governance 
  Dependent variable 
  Risk1 CSR_net InsOwn 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Risk1     0.54** 
      (0.261) 
  CSR_net 0.018***     
  (0.002)     
  InsOwn 0.26* -19.9***   
  (0.140) (4.780)   
  B-index 0.002 -0.21*** -0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.071) (0.001) 
  Inv E-index -0.002 0.22*** 0.014*** 
  (0.002) (0.077) (0.002) 
  Size -0.002 -0.058 -0.017*** 
  (0.002) (0.094) (0.002) 
  ROA -0.103***     
  (0.010)     
  B/M 0.010*** -0.643***   
  (0.002) (0.115)   
  Lev 0.056*** -2.407*** -0.057*** 
  (0.009) (0.373) (0.015) 
  Sgrowth -0.007**     
  (0.003)     
  Age -0.000     
  (0.002)     
  Liquidity     -0.000 
      (0.001) 
  Tobin's Q     -0.006*** 
      (0.001) 
  Intercept, industry Yes Yes Yes 
  and year dummies 
  n 3,310 3,310 3,310 
This table provides regression estimates under simultaneous equations 3SLS. The purpose of the tests is to 
investigate the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking, while taking governance quality and the 
endogeneity of CSR into account. Models 1 through 3 define each equation within the system with Risk1 (the 
volatility of corporate profits), the CSR net score, and inside ownership as dependent variables. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms 
from 1998 to 2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources 
are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9b. SEM (3SLS): Risk1, CSR strengths vs. concerns, and governance 
  Panel A Dependent variable   Panel B Dependent variable 
  Risk1 CSR_str InsOwn   Risk1 CSR_con InsOwn 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  Risk1     0.57***   Risk1     0.245 
      (0.202)       (0.266) 
  CSR_str 1.12***       CSR_con -1.25***     
  (0.197)       (0.168)     
  InsOwn 0.50*** -1.04***     InsOwn -0.32** -0.46***   
  (0.168) (0.111)     (0.144) (0.118)   
  B-index 0.004* -0.011*** -0.012***   B-index -0.002 -0.004** -0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
  Inv E-index -0.008*** 0.016*** 0.013***   Inv E-index 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Size -0.022*** 0.008*** -0.017***   Size 0.024*** 0.017*** -0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
  ROA -0.116***       ROA -0.097***     
  (0.015)       (0.010)     
  B/M 0.014*** -0.010***     B/M 0.005** 0.006**   
  (0.003) (0.003)     (0.002) (0.003)   
  Lev 0.103*** -0.099*** -0.055***   Lev -0.021** -0.038*** -0.040*** 
  (0.016) (0.011) (0.014)   (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) 
  Sgrowth -0.013***       Sgrowth 0.004     
  (0.005)       (0.003)     
  Age -0.003*       Age 0.001     
  (0.002)       (0.002)     
  Liquidity     0.001   Liquidity     -0.002* 
      (0.001)       (0.001) 
  Tobin's Q     -0.004***   Tobin's Q     0.000 
      (0.001)       (0.001) 
Intercept, industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept, industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
and year dummies and year dummies 
  n 3,310 3,310 3,310   n 3,310 3,310 3,310 
This table provides regression estimates under simultaneous equations 3SLS. The purpose of the tests is to investigate the 
association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking, while taking governance quality and the endogeneity of CSR into 
account. Panel A reports the results of the system of equations using Risk1, CSR strengths, and inside ownership as dependent 
variables. Panel B reports similar results with CSR strengths replaced by concerns. Standard errors are reported in brackets below 
the coefficients. The sample consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 2009. Variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Other results are consistent with previous studies. Model 1 reports a positive relationship 
between the fraction of insider ownership and risk-taking. This is consistent with the literature on 
risk-taking, particularly Jensen and Meckling (1976), which asserts that increasing stock 
ownership is the most direct way of increasing the manager’s risk appetite and thereby aligning 
his interests with those of shareholders.   
As before, we repeat the testing procedure using the aggregate scores of CSR strengths and 
concerns. Panel A of Table 9b reports the results of SEM using Risk1, CSR strengths, and 
governance as the dependent variables of the system of equations. Panel B reports the results of 
same test after replacing CSR strengths with concerns. 
Table 9b provides further support for the results reported in the previous analyses. CSR 
strengths (concerns) exhibit at positive (negative) relation to risk-taking under both SEM and OLS 
regressions. However, the governance indices do not necessarily exhibit a consistent association 
with risk-taking, depending on which CSR score is used. 
Any estimates that indicate an inverse relationship between governance quality and risk-
taking contradict prior theory and literature regarding managerial risk preferences. Theoretical 
evidence from Byrd et al. (1998) and empirical evidence from John et al. (2008) strongly signify 
that risk-taking should increase with governance quality. This is because governance measures are 
intended to serve and protect shareholder interests from adverse managerial decisions, among 
which are the preferences of conservative and thus sub-optimal risk policies.  
With respect to CSR and risk-taking, these findings not only confirm previous results, but 
also indicate that accounting for differences in governance uncovers a much stronger association. 
Risk-taking is shown to be much more sensitive to both CSR strengths and concerns relative to 
what was observed from OLS results.  
 
Sensitivity Tests: Aggregate CSR measures and alternative risk-taking proxies under SEM 
For robustness, we repeat the 3SLS testing procedure for each of the remaining proxies for 
risk-taking. Results are reported in similar format in Tables 10a, 10b, 11a, 11b, 12a, and 12b. 
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Tables 10a, 10b, 11a, 11b, 12a, and 12b all report robust results with respect to the sign 
and significance of CSR’s association with risk-taking. For all risk-taking proxies under SEM, the 
estimate for the net aggregate CSR score is positive and significant. Furthermore, all estimates for 
CSR strengths (concerns) are robust and positive (negative). The tables also show that the 
estimates of CSR strengths and concerns are roughly equal in magnitude. 
 Regarding governance, the B-Index shows robust negative associations with CSR strengths 
and insider ownership, and a positive association with CSR concerns. On the other hand, the E-
Index shows robust positive associations with both CSR strengths and concerns in addition to 
inside ownership. With respect to risk-taking, the B-Index shares a negative association with Risk1 
and Risk2, a positive one with the EDF, and no significant relation with idiosyncratic risk. The 
association between the E-Index and risk-taking tends to change depending on whether CSR 
strengths or concerns are used in the system of equations.  
 Consistent results are observed when using different datasets and econometric 
specifications. Additional sensitivity tests were conducted using corporate governance variables 
derived from KLD STAT as opposed to RiskMetrics, lagged CSR scores, year dummies, and 
industry dummies denoted by the Fama and French (1997) 48 industries. All tests yielded the same 
outcome with respect to CSR and risk-taking. While the use of year dummies and Fama-French 
industry dummies in other tests yielded inconsistent results, strong robustness is observed 
throughout SEM, thereby providing supporting evidence of a well-specified model as well as the 
necessity of correcting for endogeneity. 
Taken together, the SEM results provide strong evidence that overall CSR performance is 
associated with increased managerial risk-taking while correcting for endogeneity linked to 
governance quality and insider ownership. They also indicate that CSR strengths and concerns 
have distinct and opposite effects on risk-taking, effects that are much larger in magnitude than 
that of the net CSR score. This provides additional confirmation that net scores may result in a loss 
of fine-grained or underlying information.  
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Table 10a. SEM (3SLS): Risk2, CSR, and governance 
  Dependent variable 
  Risk2 CSR_net InsOwn 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Risk2     0.16** 
      (0.078) 
  CSR_net 0.063***     
  (0.006)     
  InsOwn 1.15*** -20.0***   
  (0.408) (4.774)   
  B-index 0.011** -0.22*** -0.012*** 
  (0.005) (0.071) (0.001) 
  Inv E-index -0.010* 0.22*** 0.014*** 
  (0.006) (0.077) (0.002) 
  Size -0.003 -0.060 -0.018*** 
  (0.006) (0.094) (0.002) 
  ROA -0.337***     
  (0.029)     
  B/M 0.036*** -0.64***   
  (0.006) (0.115)   
  Lev 0.191*** -2.41*** -0.055*** 
  (0.026) (0.373) (0.014) 
  Sgrowth -0.019**     
  (0.008)     
  Age 0.001     
  (0.005)     
  Liquidity     -0.000 
      (0.001) 
  Tobin's Q     -0.006*** 
      (0.001) 
  Intercept, industry Yes Yes Yes 
  and year dummies 
  n 3,310 3,310 3,310 
This table provides regression estimates under simultaneous equations 3SLS. The purpose of the tests is to 
investigate the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking, while taking governance quality and the 
endogeneity of CSR into account. Models 1 through 3 define each equation within the system with Risk2 (the 
earnings gap), the CSR net score, and inside ownership as dependent variables. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 
2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided 
in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
81 
 
Table 10b. SEM (3SLS): Risk2, CSR strengths vs. concerns, and governance 
  Panel A Dependent variable   Panel B Dependent variable 
  Risk2 CSR_str InsOwn   Risk2 CSR_con InsOwn 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  Risk2     0.16***   Risk2     0.069 
      (0.061)       (0.080) 
  CSR_str 3.93***       CSR_con -4.11***     
  (0.551)       (0.514)     
  InsOwn 2.08*** -1.05***     InsOwn -0.81* -0.47***   
  (0.485) (0.111)     (0.449) (0.118)   
  B-index 0.018*** -0.011*** -0.012***   B-index -0.004 -0.004** -0.013*** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) 
  Inv E-index -0.035*** 0.016*** 0.013***   Inv E-index 0.039*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Size -0.070*** 0.008*** -0.017***   Size 0.083*** 0.017*** -0.019*** 
  (0.013) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) 
  ROA -0.381***       ROA -0.32***     
  (0.041)       (0.031)     
  B/M 0.048*** -0.010***     B/M 0.018** 0.006**   
  (0.010) (0.003)     (0.007) (0.003)   
  Lev 0.36*** -0.099*** -0.052***   Lev -0.073*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
  (0.047) (0.011) (0.014)   (0.027) (0.009) (0.014) 
  Sgrowth -0.040***       Sgrowth 0.017*     
  (0.013)       (0.009)     
  Age -0.008*       Age 0.004     
  (0.005)       (0.006)     
  Liquidity     0.001   Liquidity     -0.002 
      (0.001)       (0.001) 
  Tobin's Q     -0.004***   Tobin's Q     0.000 
      (0.001)       (0.001) 
Intercept, industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept, industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
and year dummies and year dummies 
  n 3,310 3,310 3,310   n 3,310 3,310 3,310 
This table provides regression estimates under simultaneous equations 3SLS. The purpose of the tests is to investigate the 
association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking, while taking governance quality and the endogeneity of CSR into 
account. Panel A reports the results of the system of equations using Risk2 (the earnings gap), CSR strengths, and inside 
ownership as dependent variables. Panel B reports similar results with CSR strengths replaced by concerns. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 
2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11a. SEM (3SLS): EDF, CSR, and governance 
  Dependent variable 
  EDF CSR_net InsOwn 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  EDF     -0.032 
      (0.063) 
  CSR_net 0.077***     
  (0.005)     
  InsOwn 1.50*** -20.9***   
  (0.328) (4.747)   
  B-index 0.018*** -0.23*** -0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.071) (0.001) 
  Inv E-index -0.015*** 0.23*** 0.014*** 
  (0.005) (0.076) (0.002) 
  Size 0.002 -0.077 -0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.093) (0.002) 
  ROA -0.154***     
  (0.020)     
  B/M 0.097*** -0.690***   
  (0.006) (0.121)   
  Lev 0.253*** -2.44*** -0.042*** 
  (0.022) (0.373) (0.014) 
  Sgrowth 0.046***     
  (0.005)     
  Age 0.006*     
  (0.003)     
  Liquidity     -0.000 
      (0.001) 
  Tobin's Q     -0.007*** 
      (0.001) 
  Intercept, industry Yes Yes Yes 
  and year dummies 
  n 3,310 3,310 3,310 
This table provides regression estimates under simultaneous equations 3SLS. The purpose of the tests is to 
investigate the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking, while taking governance quality and the 
endogeneity of CSR into account. Models 1 through 3 define each equation within the system with the EDF, the 
CSR net score, and inside ownership as dependent variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the 
coefficients. The sample consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 2009. Variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 11b. SEM (3SLS): EDF, CSR strengths vs. concerns, and governance 
  Panel A Dependent variable   Panel B Dependent variable 
  EDF CSR_str InsOwn   EDF CSR_con InsOwn 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  EDF     -0.061   EDF     0.040 
      (0.055)       (0.064) 
  CSR_str 4.18***       CSR_con -4.78***     
  (0.431)       (0.451)     
  InsOwn 2.63*** -1.10***     InsOwn -0.86** -0.47***   
  (0.417) (0.109)     (0.432) (0.117)   
  B-index 0.027*** -0.012*** -0.012***   B-index -0.001 -0.004** -0.013*** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) 
  Inv E-index -0.044*** 0.017*** 0.014***   Inv E-index 0.042*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
  (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Size -0.064*** 0.007*** -0.018***   Size 0.102*** 0.017*** -0.019*** 
  (0.011) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) 
  ROA -0.134***       ROA -0.13***     
  (0.028)       (0.022)     
  B/M 0.108*** -0.013***     B/M 0.071*** 0.007**   
  (0.009) (0.003)     (0.008) (0.003)   
  Lev 0.424*** -0.101*** -0.036***   Lev -0.063** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
  (0.040) (0.011) (0.014)   (0.027) (0.009) (0.014) 
  Sgrowth 0.029***       Sgrowth 0.086***     
  (0.009)       (0.008)     
  Age -0.003       Age 0.008     
  (0.004)       (0.005)     
  Liquidity     0.001   Liquidity     -0.002 
      (0.001)       (0.001) 
  Tobin's Q     -0.004***   Tobin's Q     0.000 
      (0.001)       (0.001) 
Intercept, industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept, industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
and year dummies and year dummies 
  n 3,310 3,310 3,310   n 3,310 3,310 3,310 
This table provides regression estimates under simultaneous equations 3SLS. The purpose of the tests is to investigate the 
association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking, while taking governance quality and the endogeneity of CSR into 
account. Panel A reports the results of the system of equations using the EDF, CSR strengths, and inside ownership as dependent 
variables. Panel B reports similar results with CSR strengths replaced by concerns. Standard errors are reported in brackets below 
the coefficients. The sample consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 2009. Variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12a. SEM (3SLS): Idiosyncratic risk, CSR, and governance 
  Dependent variable 
  Idrisk CSR_net InsOwn 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Idrisk     1.021* 
      (0.564) 
  CSR_net 0.006***     
  (0.001)     
  InsOwn 0.001 -19.6***   
  (0.045) (4.806)   
  B-index 0.000 -0.21*** -0.013*** 
  (0.001) (0.071) (0.001) 
  Inv E-index 0.001 0.21*** 0.014*** 
  (0.001) (0.077) (0.002) 
  Size -0.004*** -0.050 -0.016*** 
  (0.001) (0.095) (0.002) 
  ROA -0.031***     
  (0.003)     
  B/M 0.009*** -0.61***   
  (0.001) (0.118)   
  Lev 0.012*** -2.39*** -0.048*** 
  (0.003) (0.374) (0.013) 
  Sgrowth -0.001     
  (0.001)     
  Age -0.002***     
  (0.001)     
  Liquidity     -0.001 
      (0.001) 
  Tobin's Q     -0.007*** 
      (0.001) 
  Intercept, industry Yes Yes Yes 
  and year dummies 
  n 3,310 3,310 3,310 
This table provides regression estimates under simultaneous equations 3SLS. The purpose of the tests is to 
investigate the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking, while taking governance quality and the 
endogeneity of CSR into account.  Models 1 through 3 define each equation within the system with idiosyncratic 
risk, the CSR net score, and inside ownership as dependent variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below 
the coefficients. The sample consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 2009. Variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12b. SEM (3SLS): Idiosyncratic risk, CSR strengths vs. concerns, and governance 
  Panel A Dependent variable   Panel B Dependent variable 
  Idrisk CSR_str InsOwn   Idrisk CSR_con InsOwn 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  Idrisk     1.40***   Idrisk     1.58*** 
      (0.491)       (0.571) 
CSR_str 0.39***       CSR_con -0.56***     
  (0.076)       (0.038)     
  InsOwn 0.044 -0.99***     InsOwn -0.22*** -0.43***   
  (0.064) (0.115)     (0.044) (0.119)   
  B-index 0.000 -0.011*** -0.013***   B-index -0.002*** -0.004** -0.013*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
  Inv E-index -0.001 0.016*** 0.013***   Inv E-index 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Size -0.011*** 0.009*** -0.015***   Size 0.008*** 0.018*** -0.016*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
  ROA -0.036***       ROA -0.033***     
  (0.005)       (0.002)     
  B/M 0.010*** -0.007**     B/M 0.007*** 0.008***   
  (0.001) (0.003)     (0.001) (0.003)   
  Lev 0.027*** -0.097*** -0.047***   Lev -0.019*** -0.037*** -0.040*** 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.013)   (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) 
  Sgrowth -0.002       Sgrowth 0.004***     
  (0.002)       (0.001)     
  Age -0.003***       Age -0.001**     
  (0.001)       (0.000)     
  Liquidity     0.001   Liquidity     -0.003** 
      (0.001)       (0.001) 
  Tobin's Q     -0.005***   Tobin's Q     0.001 
      (0.001)       (0.001) 
Intercept, 
industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept, industry 
Yes Yes Yes 
and year 
dummies 
and year dummies 
  n 3,310 3,310 3,310   n 3,310 3,310 3,310 
This table provides regression estimates under simultaneous equations 3SLS. The purpose of the tests is to investigate the 
association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-taking, while taking governance quality and the endogeneity of CSR into 
account.  Panel A reports the results of the system of equations using idiosyncratic risk, CSR strengths, and inside ownership 
as dependent variables. Panel B reports similar results with CSR strengths replaced by concerns. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 3,310 firm-year observations across 941 firms from 1998 to 2009. 
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the 
appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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More importantly, the SEM results shed light on the role of corporate governance with 
respect to CSR and risk-taking. The preceding analyses involving governance interaction terms 
yielded inconsistent or unexpected results regarding the impact of strong governance quality on 
the main test relationship. Even throughout SEM, we do not necessarily observe a persistently 
positive association as hypothesized between governance quality (internal or external) and CSR or 
risk-taking. However, we do find strong evidence in support of the existence of the 
interrelationships denoted in Figure 1. For instance, the governance indices are found to have 
significant effects (regardless of sign) on CSR, risk-taking, and insider ownership, while insider 
ownership is found to have significant effects on CSR and risk-taking, and so on. This suggests 
that the quality of corporate governance is not simply a pre-set determinant of the nature of the 
CSR-risk-taking association, but that the combined variations and causative effects between all 
variables must be taken into consideration. Overall, the results substantiate the supposition that 
insider ownership and corporate governance are meaningful channels through which CSR and risk-
taking relate to one another. 
 
5.5. Additional tests investigating the impact of high firm visibility 
 Additional testing is conducted to determine the effect of high firm visibility on the 
association between CSR and risk-taking. The actions of highly visible firms generally face much 
more scrutiny from the media and the general public (Fombrun, 1996). In addition, activists and 
related stakeholder groups frequently target such firms in order to draw more attention to a 
particular issue (Porter and Kramer, 2006). The potential for bad press and its associated financial 
losses make visible firms especially sensitive to reputational concerns (Strike et al., 2006) and 
consequently may have more incentives to carefully manage their performance in social 
responsibility (Brown et al., 2006). Because high visibility is associated with external pressures, 
whether real or perceived, from the media, stakeholder groups, and also financial analysts, we 
investigate whether visible firms take different actions and decisions that may affect the 
association between CSR and risk-taking.  
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 Extensive analyst following and membership in the S&P 500 index are indicative of high 
visibility (Bouslah et al., 2013). Thus we use both measures as proxies of firm visibility. Bradley 
et al. (2008) find that analysts tend to cover firms that are larger and more visible, while Jo et al. 
(2012) find that analyst coverage is positively related to CSR engagement. Regarding the S&P 
500, Bouslah et al. (2013) describe member firms as highly visible for media and analysts and 
likely to display more transparency in CSR activities and its impacts. Empirically, they find that 
S&P 500 member firms are less risky while exhibiting more CSR strengths as well as more 
concerns relative to non-member firms.  
We begin by developing an econometric model intended to capture the effect of wide 
analyst coverage on the main test relationship. The model is presented as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8 9
1 _ _ _ * _it it it it it
it it it it it it it
Risk CSR net AF dum CSR net AF dum
Size ROA BM Lev Sgrowth Age
α α α α
α α α α α α ε
 = + + + + 
+ + + + + +
 (19) 
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1 _ _ _
_ * _ _ * _
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it it it it
it it it it it it it
Risk CSR str CSR con AF dum
CSR str AF dum CSR con AF dum
Size ROA BM Lev Sgrowth Age
α α α α
α α
α α α α α α ε
= + + + +
   + +   
+ + + + + +
  (20) 
 
 Eq. (19) defines Risk1 as a function of the net aggregate CSR score, a dummy variable 
indicating extensive analyst following (AF_dum), an interaction term combining the dummy 
variable with the CSR score ((CSR_net)*(AF_dum)), and firm-level control variables. The dummy 
variable (AF_dum) takes a value of one if the particular firm-year observation has an analyst 
following greater than the sample median, and zero otherwise.  
 Eq. (20) defines a similar function where CSR is decomposed into its strengths and 
concerns while including the appropriate interaction terms.  
We focus on the coefficients of the interaction terms in order to observe the impact of 
extensive analyst following on CSR and risk-taking. If greater following emphasizes this 
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association, we would observe a positive coefficient on the interaction term in Eq. (19). Likewise, 
an insignificant or negative coefficient would signify no impact or a dampening of the association, 
respectively. A similar interpretation can be applied to the results Eq. (20). Table 13a presents the 
regression estimates of Eq. (19) while Table 13b presents those of Eq. (20). Each table report 
results of all risk-taking proxies, indicated by Models 1 through 4. 
Table 13a reports that the analyst following dummy (AF_dum) shares a positive relation 
with Risk1, Risk2, and idiosyncratic risk, but no relation with the EDF. Accordingly, only the 
models involving Risk1, Risk2, and idiosyncratic risk show a significant coefficient for the 
interaction term, however the signs are different between the market-based and accounting-based 
proxies. Models involving Risk1 and Risk2 report a negative and significant loading on the 
interaction terms while the model involving idiosyncratic risk report a positive one. The coefficient 
of net CSR score is significant and positive only for Risk1 and Risk2, consistent with prior results. 
 Table 13b reports similar results. The analyst following dummy is positive and significant 
for the same proxies, Risk1, Risk2, and idiosyncratic risk. Only the interaction terms involving 
CSR strengths are significant for models involving Risk1 and Risk2 only. Significant loadings are 
not observed for the market-based proxies or among the CSR concerns altogether. The CSR 
strengths and concerns have their expected loadings with respect to Risk1 and Risk2. However, 
both strengths and concerns display non-significance with respect to the EDF and idiosyncratic 
risk. This is unlike previous results in that CSR strengths were reported to have a positive 
association with both market-based proxies. 
 The preceding tests are repeated with analyst following replaced by S&P 500 membership. 
The dummy variable (SP_dum) takes a value of one for firms that have been included in the index 
any time within the sample period (1995-2009) and zero otherwise. The interaction terms are 
altered accordingly. Results are presented in Tables 14a and 14b. 
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Table 13a. OLS: Risk-taking on CSR involving analyst following interaction terms 
  Dependent variable 
AF Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CSR_net 0.079** 0.189** 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.033) (0.077) (0.001) (0.000) 
  AF_dum 0.115** 0.275** 0.001 0.002*** 
  (0.050) (0.115) (0.003) (0.001) 
  (CSR_net)*(AF_dum) -0.068** -0.161** 0.001 0.0001* 
  (0.032) (0.075) (0.001) (0.000) 
  Size 0.076** 0.180** -0.000 -0.003*** 
  (0.032) (0.077) (0.001) (0.000) 
  ROA 0.210 0.452 -0.058*** -0.018*** 
  (0.214) (0.527) (0.019) (0.002) 
  B/M 0.044 0.101 0.045*** 0.005*** 
  (0.063) (0.151) (0.005) (0.001) 
  Lev 0.086 0.202 0.115*** 0.008** 
  (0.075) (0.177) (0.043) (0.004) 
  Sgrowth 0.235** 0.548** 0.027*** 0.000 
  (0.113) (0.262) (0.008) (0.000) 
  Age 0.015 0.038 -0.003* -0.002*** 
  (0.024) (0.059) (0.002) (0.000) 
  Constant -0.320 -0.729 -0.029*** 0.041*** 
  (0.221) (0.528) (0.011) (0.002) 
  n 8,869 8,869 8,869 8,869 
  Adj R^2 0.082 0.082 0.169 0.317 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate whether and how high firm visibility affects the association between aggregate 
CSR scores and risk-taking. All risk-taking proxies are regressed on the interactions of aggregate CSR scores with 
dummies indicating high analyst following, in addition to control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets 
below the coefficients. The sample consists of 8,869 firm-year observations across 1,735 firms from 1995 to 2009. 
Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the 
appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results 
are omitted.  
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Table 13b. OLS: Risk-taking on CSR strengths and concerns involving analyst following 
interaction terms 
  Dependent variable 
AF Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CSR_str 3.375*** 8.103*** 0.035 0.007 
  (1.188) (2.862) (0.026) (0.006) 
  CSR_con -1.947* -4.563* 0.016 0.010 
  (1.119) (2.627) (0.045) (0.009) 
  AF_dum 0.212*** 0.509*** -0.002 0.003*** 
  (0.065) (0.153) (0.003) (0.001) 
  (CSR_str)*(AF_dum) -3.55*** -8.470*** 0.045 0.010 
  (1.324) (3.156) (0.038) (0.006) 
  (CSR_con)*(AF_dum) -0.043 -0.178 0.022 -0.008 
  (0.660) (1.564) (0.042) (0.005) 
  Size 0.112** 0.264** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
  (0.048) (0.114) (0.001) (0.000) 
  ROA 0.144 0.296 -0.056*** -0.018*** 
  (0.193) (0.477) (0.019) (0.002) 
  B/M 0.032 0.074 0.046*** 0.005*** 
  (0.062) (0.147) (0.004) (0.001) 
  Lev 0.018 0.041 0.118*** 0.008** 
  (0.073) (0.173) (0.043) (0.004) 
  Sgrowth 0.239** 0.556** 0.027*** -0.000 
  (0.113) (0.263) (0.007) (0.000) 
  Age 0.019 0.048 -0.004** -0.002*** 
  (0.023) (0.057) (0.002) (0.000) 
  Constant -0.337 -0.772 -0.028** 0.041*** 
  (0.288) (0.689) (0.012) (0.002) 
  n 8,869 8,869 8,869 8,869 
  Adj R^2 0.099 0.099 0.171 0.322 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate whether and how high firm visibility affects the association between aggregate 
CSR scores and risk-taking. All risk-taking proxies are regressed on the interactions of CSR strengths/concerns 
with dummies indicating high analyst following, in addition to control variables. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets below the coefficients. The sample consists of 8,869 firm-year observations across 1,735 firms from 1995 
to 2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided 
in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy 
results are omitted.  
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Results involving S&P 500 membership are highly consistent with those involving analyst 
following. Tables 14a and 14b show that the dummy variables indicating index membership are 
again positive and significant only for models using Risk1, Risk2, and idiosyncratic risk. Likewise, 
the interaction terms combining index membership and the net CSR score (CSR_net) and CSR 
strengths (CSR_str) are negative and significant only for the accounting-based proxies. No 
significance is observed for the interaction terms within the models using EDF and idiosyncratic 
risk.  
Tables 13a, 13b, 14a, and 14b provide limited evidence that high firm visibility decreases 
the effect of CSR on risk-taking, as indicated by the coefficients of the interaction terms. As 
discussed previously, highly visible firms may have more incentives to undertake CSR activities. 
In addition, the tables show that risk-taking increases with visibility. Thus one would expect a 
relatively stronger relation between CSR and risk-taking in the context of high visibility. Instead, 
we observe the opposite effect in the models pertaining to the accounting-based measures of risk-
taking. In the models pertaining to the accounting-based measures of risk-taking, high firm 
visibility is associated with a weaker association between CSR and risk-taking. This could be 
partially explained by the study by Udayasankar (2008), who suggests that large and highly visible 
firms may engage in CSR strictly for improving their public image and is detached from their 
strategic and business operations. On the other hand, high visibility appears to have no effect on 
the CSR-risk-taking relation when using the market-based proxies (EDF and idiosycnratic risk). 
This disparity among the results of different proxies makes it difficult to interpret the true effect 
of visibility.  
Further testing repeats the regressions conducted in subsection 5.1 using a subsample of 
only firms that were included in the S&P 500 Index at least once during the sample period. Risk-
taking is regressed on the aggregate CSR scores along with control variables. The unreported 
results indicate that the CSR concerns score is negatively associated with the accounting-based 
measures while CSR strengths share no association. It appears that for highly visible firms, the 
CSR strengths score is no longer positively associated with risk-taking, as was observed when 
using the full sample. This may shed light on the varying motives that different subsamples may 
have regarding their engagement in CSR. Larger firms that are more visible can be more sensitive 
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to the benefits (damages) of reputation following socially responsible (irresponsible) actions 
(Udayasankar, 2008). Because highly visible firms may have much stronger incentives to maintain 
a positive public image, they may undertake CSR activities for entirely different motives compared 
to other firms. This may in turn affect how they run their operations, including risk-taking. Deeper 
investigation may be required to understand the circumstances in which highly visible firms 
engage in CSR, as well as the disparity of results pertaining to the accounting-based vs. market-
based measures of risk-taking. 
Additional research can help to better understand the effects of high firm visibility. Future 
studies can investigate the motives and the nature of CSR activities undertaken by highly visible 
firms. Legitimate CSR for sustainability reasons may have different implications relative to 
superficial CSR activities done purely for self-interest and public image. Udayasankar (2008) 
suggests the possibility that visible firms may engage in CSR simply for projecting a positive 
image rather than integrating it into their core operations. Highly visible firms may also have 
markedly different risk-taking tendencies as well as corporate governance characteristics. It may 
be worthwhile to pinpoint the differences of all of the aforementioned variables when examining 
highly visible vs. normal firms, as such differences are likely to affect the association between 
CSR and risk-taking. 
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Table 14a. OLS: Risk-taking on CSR involving S&P 500 interaction terms 
  Dependent variable 
SP500 Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CSR_net 0.071** 0.167** 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.034) (0.081) (0.001) (0.000) 
  SP_dum 0.399*** 0.961*** 0.001 0.003** 
  (0.147) (0.354) (0.007) (0.001) 
  (CSR_net)*(SP_dum) -0.057* -0.133 0.001 0.000 
  (0.035) (0.081) (0.001) (0.000) 
  Size 0.021 0.043 -0.000 -0.003*** 
  (0.026) (0.060) (0.001) (0.000) 
  ROA -0.090 -0.231 -0.044*** -0.014*** 
  (0.236) (0.583) (0.010) (0.003) 
  B/M 0.080 0.192 0.039*** 0.004*** 
  (0.063) (0.153) (0.005) (0.001) 
  Lev 0.159* 0.405** 0.127*** 0.009*** 
  (0.082) (0.197) (0.036) (0.003) 
  Sgrowth 0.174* 0.428* 0.029*** 0.001 
  (0.094) (0.221) (0.008) (0.000) 
  Age -0.011 -0.021 -0.005*** -0.002*** 
  (0.025) (0.058) (0.002) (0.000) 
  Constant 0.184 0.465 -0.028 0.046*** 
  (0.158) (0.384) (0.017) (0.003) 
  n 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 
  Adj R^2 0.106 0.106 0.153 0.300 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The 
purpose of the tests is to investigate whether and how high firm visibility affects the association between aggregate 
CSR scores and risk-taking. All risk-taking proxies are regressed on the interactions of CSR scores with dummies 
indicating inclusion of the S&P 500, in addition to control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below 
the coefficients. The sample consists of 10,106 firm-year observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. 
Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the 
appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results 
are omitted.    
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Table 14b. OLS: Risk-taking on CSR strengths and concerns involving S&P 500 interaction terms 
  Dependent variable 
SP500 Risk1 Risk2 EDF Idrisk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CSR_str 3.58*** 8.59** 0.064* 0.015* 
  (1.380) (3.335) (0.034) (0.007) 
  CSR_con -1.625 -3.746 0.038 0.013 
  (1.244) (2.904) (0.068) (0.011) 
  SP_dum 0.516*** 1.24*** 0.001 0.003** 
  (0.174) (0.421) (0.005) (0.001) 
  (CSR_str)*(SP_dum) -3.76** -8.97** -0.005 -0.000 
  (1.501) (3.603) (0.035) (0.008) 
  (CSR_con)*(SP_dum) -0.425 -1.165 -0.008 -0.007 
  (0.993) (2.347) (0.064) (0.008) 
  Size 0.056 0.132 -0.002 -0.003*** 
  (0.036) (0.084) (0.001) (0.000) 
  ROA -0.152 -0.401 -0.043*** -0.014*** 
  (0.220) (0.534) (0.010) (0.003) 
  B/M 0.066 0.156 0.039*** 0.004*** 
  (0.058) (0.138) (0.004) (0.001) 
  Lev 0.090 0.214 0.128*** 0.009*** 
  (0.074) (0.174) (0.036) (0.003) 
  Sgrowth 0.178* 0.413* 0.028*** 0.000 
  (0.095) (0.220) (0.008) (0.000) 
  Age -0.005 -0.009 -0.006*** -0.002*** 
  (0.024) (0.058) (0.002) (0.000) 
  Constant 0.096 0.252 -0.027 0.046*** 
  (0.213) (0.516) (0.019) (0.003) 
  n 10,106 10,106 10,106 10,106 
  Adj R^2 0.124 0.125 0.154 0.305 
This table provides regression estimates under the two-way cluster standard error approach of Petersen (2009). The purpose of 
the tests is to investigate whether and how high firm visibility affects the association between aggregate CSR scores and risk-
taking. All risk-taking proxies are regressed on the interactions of CSR strengths/concerns with dummies indicating inclusion 
of the S&P 500, in addition to control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets below the coefficients. The sample 
consists of 10,106 firm-year observations across 1,959 firms from 1995 to 2009. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in the appendix. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Industry dummy results are omitted.     
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6. Conclusion 
 Corporate social responsibility continues to receive much attention from governments, 
media and the financial community. However, its relation to financial performance and the 
corporate strategy remains inconclusive. This paper addresses this issue by investigating the 
association between CSR and managerial risk-taking, as well as how differences in governance 
structure affect this association.  
Using a sample of US public firms and CSR ratings provided by KLD STAT, we find that 
CSR involvement is positively associated with risk-taking. Specifically, we find that risk-taking 
increases with the presence of CSR strengths, while it decreases with the presence of CSR 
concerns. Furthermore, we find that accounting for differences in corporate governance and 
correcting for endogeneity robustly confirms these associations. We also find that the individual 
dimensions within CSR share non-uniform associations with risk-taking. While some variability 
is observed depending on which risk-taking proxy is used, the employee relations dimension 
(particularly its related strengths) shows a robust and positive association with risk-taking. 
 Because risk-taking is necessary for firm growth and profitability, the overall findings 
support the view that CSR is consistent with value-generating managerial decisions. Moser and 
Martin (2012) describe two broad perspectives throughout the literature regarding CSR. The first 
is that managers will invest in CSR only if it increases shareholder value. Conversely, the second 
is that managers will invest in CSR even at the expense of shareholder value. Our findings do not 
fall neatly into either of these perspectives, but may actually reconcile both. CSR results in 
immediate, up-front costs that critics may argue to be detrimental to shareholder wealth. However, 
through its association with risk-taking, we can see how CSR is positively related to a managerial 
decision-making approach that has been empirically and theoretically linked to long-term value 
creation. Our findings also suggest that the positive association between CSR and risk-taking is an 
indication of sustainability and profitability, thereby explaining how CSR can lead to a reduced 
cost of equity capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011) despite the risky corporate 
operations.  
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 This paper contributes to the literature first by introducing CSR as a determinant of risk-
taking.  Second, we consider the role of corporate governance in addition to the endogeneity of 
CSR through a simultaneous equations framework. Our findings can benefit corporate boards and 
investors by providing new evidence regarding the contradictory views on CSR. They may find 
reassurance that CSR is indeed associated with higher risk tolerances, which is necessary for value 
creation and thereby consistent with shareholder interests. Our findings can also inform policy-
makers concerning the practical implications of CSR. Because our results support the view that 
CSR is value-enhancing, policies that aim to raise the standard with respect to good corporate 
citizenship can be expected to serve both shareholders and society at large.  
 While we provide the most comprehensive evidence regarding CSR and risk-taking, 
additional topics are worth pursuing in future research. First, this study can be extended 
internationally by using a global sample. This investigation can shed light on how the association 
between CSR and risk-taking differs among countries with varying standards on governance and 
perspectives towards CSR. Second, different datasets can be used in measuring the same variables. 
A dataset, other than KLD, that uses different CSR criteria or provides actual dollar expenditures 
invested in such activities could provide a unique look on the implications of CSR. Third, various 
subsamples may warrant deeper investigation. Further analysis on only highly visible firms, firms 
within the financial sector, or any other major unexamined group can shed light on how the varying 
motives and incentives of different subsamples could result in an altered relationship between CSR 
and risk-taking. Lastly, it would be worth researching in a broad sense the possible effects if certain 
CSR activities were to be made mandatory rather than voluntary. Though our findings support the 
view that CSR is value-enhancing, they may not necessarily hold in different regulatory 
environments.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
Data 
source 
Corporate risk-taking 
Risk1 
The volatility of corporate profits over a 5-year period, 
starting from the current year. Computed as the standard 
deviation of the EBITDA/Assets ratio adjusted by time, 
following John et al. (2008). 
Compustat 
Risk2 
The maximum EBITDA/Assets ratio minus the minimum 
over a 5-year period, starting from the current year, 
following Faccio et al. (2011) 
Compustat 
EDF 
Normal cumulative density function of the "distance to 
default" measure, following Vassalou et al. (2004) and 
Bharath et al. (2008) 
Compustat 
& CRSP 
Idrisk 
Idiosyncratic risk: the standard deviation of the residuals 
from the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model 
CRSP 
Corporate social responsibility  
CSR_net 
The net aggregate score of CSR performance, computed 
as the total number of indicated strengths minus the total 
number of indicated concerns across all dimensions, 
following El Ghoul et al. (2011). 
KLD 
STAT 
Com_net; Div_net; 
Emp_net; Env_net; 
Hum_net; Pro_net 
The disaggregate net score, computed as the number of 
indicated strengths minus the number of indicated 
concerns within each dimension, following El Ghoul et 
al. (2011). 
KLD 
STAT 
CSR_str; CSR_con 
The aggregate strength score and aggregate concern 
score, computed as the average of all dimensional 
strength or concern scores, following Oikonomou et al. 
(2012) 
KLD 
STAT 
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Table A1 (continued). Variable definitions 
Variable Description Data source 
Corporate social responsibility 
Com_str; Div_str; 
Emp_str; Env_str; 
Hum_str; Pro_str 
The disaggregate strength score, computed as the number 
of indicated strengths scaled by the highest possible 
number of strengths within each dimension, following 
Oikonomou et al. (2012) 
KLD STAT 
Com_con; Div_con; 
Emp_con; Env_con; 
Hum_con; Pro_con 
The disaggregate concern score, computed as the number 
of indicated concerns scaled by the highest possible 
number of concerns within each dimension, following 
Oikonomou et al. (2012) 
KLD STAT 
Corporate governance 
B-Index 
The measure of internal governance quality, ranging from 
0 to 6 depending on the independence of the board, audit 
committee, compensation committee, nomination 
committee, in addition to board size and CEO/Chairman 
duality, following Baber et al. (2012) 
RiskMetrics 
Directors 
Database 
Inv E-Index 
The inverted measure of external governance quality, 
ranging from 0 to 6 depending on the existence of 
specific provisions: Staggered board, limitation on 
amending bylaws in addition to the charter, supermajority 
requirement to approve a merger, golden parachute, and 
poison pill, following Bebchuk et al. (2006). 
RiskMetrics 
Governance 
Database 
Firm-level variables 
InsOwn 
The measure of insider ownership, computed as the 
number of shares (excluding options) held by executives 
scaled by the number of common shares outstanding, 
following Jiao (2010). 
RiskMetrics 
Directors 
Database 
Size 
The measure of firm size, computed as the natural 
logarithm of total assets in millions $US, following John 
et al. (2008) 
Compustat 
ROA 
The measure of return-on-assets, computed as earnings 
before interest, taxes, deductions, and amortization scaled 
by total assets, following Boubakri et al. (2013) 
Compustat 
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Table A1 (continued). Variable definitions 
Variable Description Data source 
Firm-level variables 
BM 
The measure of the book-to-market ratio, computed as the 
book value per share scaled by the market value of 
common equity, following Bouslah et al. (2013) 
Compustat 
Lev 
The measure of firm leverage, computed as total long-term 
debt scaled by total assets, following Boubakri et al. 
(2013) 
Compustat 
Sgrowth 
The measure of sales growth, computed as the current 
year's total sales scaled by the previous year's, following 
Faccio et al. (2011) 
Compustat 
Age 
Firm age, computed as the natural log of 1 plus the listing 
age of the firm, following Kim and Lu (2011). The listing 
age is measured as the number of years since its first trade 
date on CRSP. 
CRSP 
Liq 
Liquidity, proxied by the quick ratio, following Altman 
(1968). It is computed as the current assets scaled by 
current liabilities 
Compustat 
Tobin 
Tobin's Q, computed as the ratio of the market value of 
assets to the book value of assets. The market value of 
assets is computed as the book value of assets minus the 
book value of equity minus deferred taxes plus the market 
value of common stock, following Yermack (1996). 
Compustat 
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Table A1 (continued). Variable definitions 
Variable Description Data source 
Firm-level variables 
B_dum 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
B-Index of a given firm-year observation is greater 
than the sample median of the corresponding year, 
and zero otherwise. 
RiskMetrics 
Directors Database 
InvE_dum 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
inverted E-Index of a given firm-year observation is 
greater than the sample median of the corresponding 
year, and zero otherwise. 
RiskMetrics 
Governance 
Database 
AF_dum 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
analyst following of a given firm-year observation 
is greater than the sample median of the 
corresponding year, and zero otherwise. 
I/B/E/S 
SP_dum 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for 
firms that have been included in the S&P 500 Index 
at any time during the sample period (1995-2009), 
and zero otherwise, following Oikonomou et al., 
(2012). 
Compustat 
 
